

JPRS 80616

20 April 1982

West Europe Report

No. 1945



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

20 April 1982

WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 1945

CONTENTS

TERRORISM

GREECE

Briefs

- Details on Kavala Airport Bombing 1

ENERGY ECONOMICS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Briefs

- Nordic Solar-Energy Project 2

DENMARK

- State Oil Consortium Seen Suffering Large Deficit by 1990
(Peter Kjelstrup; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 23 Mar 82)..... 3
- Folketing Denies Energy Minister Approval for Gas Plan
(Editorial; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 22 Mar 82)..... 5
- Paper Questions Competency of Energy Minister Nielson
(Editorial; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 26 Mar 82)..... 7

GREECE

Briefs

- Natural Gas Supply Talks in Moscow 9
- New Forthcoming Drillings 9

TURKEY

Briefs

Petroleum From Iraq	10
---------------------	----

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

DGB Chairman Candidate Breit Wins Approval From All Sides (DER SPIEGEL, 29 Mar 82).....	11
--	----

GREECE

Shortages Foreseen in New Budget; Income Tax Provision (I KATHIMERINI, 14-15 Feb 82, EPIKAIRA, 18-24 Feb 92).....	14
--	----

Papandreou Position 'Moderate', by N. Nikolaou
Economy Analyzed, by G. Katsonis

Briefs

U.S. Professor's Visit	18
Increased Salaries, Wages	18

TURKEY

Conditions Reportedly Not Yet Right for Convertible Lira (Nursun Alev; TERCUMAN, 5 Feb 82).....	19
--	----

ERRATUM: In JPRS 80543 of 12 April 1982, No 1940 of this series, pp 43-48, article listed under GREECE, titled TURKEY-CSSR ROAD TRANSPORT AGREEMENT PUBLISHED, should have been published under country category TURKEY.

POLITICAL

BELGIUM

Deprez on Problems, Future of Walloon Social Christians (Gerard Deprez Interview; KNACK, 17 Feb 82).....	21
---	----

CANADA

Briefs

French Premier's Visit	27
------------------------	----

CYPRUS

- Foreign Minister Rolandhis Addresses Nonaligned Meeting
(Nikolaos Rolandhis; PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICE,
7 Apr 82)..... 28

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- North Rhine-Westphalia FDP Aims To Return to Landtag
(Lothar Bewerunge; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 23 Mar 82)..... 31
- Long-Term Effect of Lower Saxony Election on FDP Viewed
(Karl Feldmeyer; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 24 Mar 82)..... 33

FINLAND

- Poll Shows Continued High Support for Koivisto
(UUSI SUOMI, 14 Mar 82)..... 35
- Finland Preparing Initiatives To Break CSCE Impasse
(UUSI SUOMI, 13 Mar 82)..... 37
- CSCE Ambassador Richard Muller Discusses Madrid Conference
(Richard Muller Interview; UUSI SUOMI, 13 Mar 82)..... 38

GREECE

- KKE Paper Objects to Rogers' Visit in June
(RIZOSPASTIS, 8 Apr 82)..... 39
- Intraparty ND Differences on Attitude Toward PASOK Analyzed
(EPIKAIRA, 18-24 Mar 82)..... 40
- Comments on Bombing Incidents Presented
(Editorial; I KATHIMERINI, 16 Mar 82, I AVGI, 16 Mar 82).... 43
- Disquieting 'Chain' Probed
'Neo-Fascist' Influence Seen

TURKEY

- Trial of DISK Leaders Under Way
(CUMHURIYET, 25 Dec 81)..... 46
- Opening Trial Moves, by Sukran Ketenci, Necdet Dogan
Attorneys Haggles With Bench
Articles Cited for DISK Prosecution
'State of War' Provisions
- Aldikacti Interviewed on New Constitution
(Orhan Aldikacti Interview; TERCUMAN, 6 Apr 82)..... 53

Fahri Asserts Intrinsic Western Enmity Toward Turkey (Mehmet Fahri; MILLI GAZETE, 5 Feb 82).....	56
Mumcu Examines Greek Adventurism (Ugur Mumcu; CUMHURIYET, 5 Feb 82).....	58

MILITARY

CYPRUS

ERRATUM: National Guard Uniform Changes (O AGON, 19 Mar 82).....	61
---	----

GREECE

U.S. Blackmail Charged in F-16 Purchase (Sp. Karatzaferis; ELEVTHEROTYPIA, 8 Feb 82).....	62
Personnel Reductions in National Defense Battalions (TO VIMA, 9 Feb 82, RIZOSPASTIS, 6 Feb 82).....	65
Defense Ministry Decision, by K. Giannopoulos KKE Disbandment Demand	
Bill Proposes Changes in Police Forces (EXORMISIS TIS KYRIAKIS, 7 Feb 82, I AVGI, 10 Feb 82).....	67
Promotions Outlined Previous Dismissals Studied	

GENERAL

TURKEY

Briefs Consultative Assembly Appointment	69
---	----

GREECE

BRIEFS

DETAILS ON KAVALA AIRPORT BOMBING--Two incendiary explosive devices caused the extensive fire at the Kavala international airport. This is the conclusion reached by the investigation conducted by experts on behalf of the Ministries of Public Works and Transportation. The devices left few traces and the resulting high temperatures melted even hard metals in the terminal. One device had been placed in an open area that communicates with the main building and where warehouses will be built. The second had been placed in a corner of the terminal, near the building's entrance. The saboteurs must have been at least two and apparently were free to carry out their activities since there were no guards at the airport. Their work was well organized and shows that they were familiar with the manufacture and use of explosives. The fire caused damage amounting to over 16 million drachmas. [Text] [Athens TA NEA in Greek 28 Mar 82 p 1]

CSO: 4621/278

BRIEFS

NORDIC SOLAR-ENERGY PROJECT--The joint construction research group (NBS-energy) under the Nordic Council has presented a proposal for Nordic cooperation in the use of solar energy. The directions for cooperation were outlined at a meeting held in Sandvik, Norway, which was attended by Turku University Physics Professor Martti Hamalainen from Finland. NBS-energy established a contact group for the purpose of developing cooperation, which in addition to Hamalainen from Finland will include engineering licentiate Peter Lund from the Technical College, as well as three specialized groups for developing measurement procedures, arranging type-approval for solar energy equipment, and observing the operational testing of solar heating systems. [Text] [Helsinki UUSU SUOMI in Finnish 16 Mar 82 p 8] 10576

STATE OIL CONSORTIUM SEEN SUFFERING LARGE DEFICIT BY 1990

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 23 Mar 82 p 7

[Article by Peter Kjelstrup]

[Text] The Danish Oil and Natural Gas Co., Inc., will, this year, suffer a deficit of 654 million kroner. and this deficit will, according to DONG's (Danish Oil and Natural Gas Co., Inc.) own budgets, increase year by year and will, in 1990, amount to a total of 8 billion kroner.

This appears from figures presented by the state-owned company to the Gas and Heating Price Committee in an effort to persuade the said committee to approve the company's ideas of higher and different prices of gas to industry. This was rejected by the committee.

According to the figures from DONG, the company's total investments will amount to 9.7 billion kroner in 1991. That year, the accumulated deficit will amount to 8.1 billion kroner, so that the total need for capital after depreciations will amount to a total of 15.4 billion kroner. Only in 1991 will this figure start declining in that, for the first time in a decade, there will then be a surplus on the general operating account. A surplus which will amount to 185 million kroner before taxes.

At the meeting yesterday of the Gas and Heating Price Committee, the company was told in clear terms that it could not expect any help from the committee. It is the so-called cost principle which applies when the company fixes its prices, which means that two enterprises cannot be charged two different prices unless it is considerably more costly to convey the gas to the one than to the other. The same principle shall apply to the individual provinces. It will thus be possible to charge higher prices for the gas in the capital than in North Schleswig because it is more costly to convey the gas to Copenhagen.

In a progress report of February, the chairman of DONG warned that the very sensitive profitability status of the company would be considerably impaired if the company would not be allowed to charge as high prices as possible from each individual customer.

However, the Gas and Heating Price Committee of the Registrar of Restrictive Trade Practices was not prepared to take a position on the concrete proposals presented by DONG. On the other hand, the company was asked to report the prices which, for the time being, have been agreed upon with Naturgas Syd [Natural Gas South] in order for the committee to check if these prices are legal.

According to the application to the Registrar of Restrictive Trade Practices, DONG itself regards its request for advance notification as unusual. But, according to Jens Christensen, chairman of DONG, the advance notification is "decisive for DONG's price calculations and for DONG's economic basis," as Jens Christensen expressed it.

The answer to the request was thus that DONG shall not be permitted to apply other price mechanisms than those applying to other energy companies.

7262

CSO: 3106/88

FOLKETING DENIES ENERGY MINISTER APPROVAL FOR GAS PLAN

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 22 Mar 82 p 8

[Editorial: "The Natural Gas"]

[Text] Energy Minister Poul Nielson did not receive the support of the Folketing last week for inclusion of Mid-Jutland and North Jutland in the large natural gas project. However, especially as far as the Socialist People's Party, the Radical Liberal Party, the Christian People's Party, and the Liberal Party are concerned, certain possibilities of compromise are believed to exist. A higher degree of local influence on the natural gas project may thus result in a cooperation with the Socialist People's Party and the Liberal Party.

However, agreements on the natural gas project extending beyond the central problems to which this project gives rise, should be clearly discouraged.

Natural gas represents a very rigid and not very flexible heating system. The economic consequences of the present project, as seen in relation to realistic heating alternatives, have never been elucidated in a reasonable manner. It is, in that context, very difficult to understand that it would not be the most advantageous thing to sell the major part of the natural gas to West Germany where the population density is far greater and a natural gas network already exists.

Before the natural gas is conveyed to East Denmark, or natural gas investments are undertaken in the Mid-Jutland and North Jutland area, a study of the economic profitability of the project should thus be made. There are already many indications that, through its natural gas decision of the spring of 1979, the Folketing set the stage for a major unsuccessful economic investment. Actually, the existence of such suspicion does not serve the interests of the natural gas interests and the energy minister either. That is why the project should now be reevaluated before the big investment activity has started in East Denmark. Such studies should be performed by impartial economists and technicians from outside the circles of the Ministry of Energy and the regional natural gas companies.

Should it then turn out that the natural gas investments ought to continue, a better system of management and organization than the one existing so far should, however, be arranged. The emphasis on DONG and the regional natural gas companies has hardly turned out to be a success. To this comes that the obscurities in respect of the natural gas prices, the terms of connection, and the regional delimitations have created uncertainty in the the heating planning in the various municipalities as well as in industry.

It is to be feared today that the natural gas project, in many respects, is developing into a national mistake. The energy minister cannot remove that fear by simply proposing an expansion of the project and stubbornly refusing a reevaluation of the decisions already made. Denmark is not in a situation where it can afford any major wrong investments in the energy sector.

7262

CSO: 3106/88

PAPER QUESTIONS COMPETENCY OF ENERGY MINISTER NIELSON

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 26 Mar 82 p 8

[Editorial: "Poul Nielson's Career"]

[Text] Poul Nielson, Social Democratic M.P., was in 1979 appointed to the newly established office of energy minister. This happened at a time when many energy policy efforts had already been started, among other things, in response to the sharp increase in oil prices agreed upon by the OPEC countries in 1973 and the year when the energy minister was appointed. In the spring of 1979, the Folketing had thus also decided to start the first phase of the large Danish natural gas project.

Against that background, it is clear that it is not only Poul Nielson who is responsible for the energy policy pursued in this country so far. But it is, on the other hand, equally clear that, since his appointment in the fall of 1979, Poul Nielsen has had the highest administrative and political responsibility for the Danish energy policy during a period where very far-reaching decisions had to be made, and when there also were reasonable possibilities of correcting decisions which had already been made and which might appear less well-founded.

The fact that Poul Nielson has been unsuccessful in his management of the Danish energy policy cannot be concealed today. This fact has been ascertained in nearly every context where the public has become acquainted with the energy minister.

Actually, Poul Nielson started his work with drums beating and flags flying. Nobody has thus forgotten his widely advertised negotiations with various Arab oil countries. As is well-known, they resulted in the notorious "clear" agreement on the purchase of crude oil in Saudi Arabia. It soon turned out that the agreement was not clear at all but, on the contrary, was subject to political conditions. The minister's theory of the economic advantage associated with the deal has also turned out to be untenable.

More recently, the energy minister has presided over a development in the energy area which has brought the natural gas project into completely

incalculable difficulties and has created considerable uncertainty among all potential natural gas customers. He has caused the relationship of the state with the company under the A. P. Møller concern which has the greatest know-how in the area of energy in this country, to become extremely strained, and he has just been caught in an attempt to persuade the finance committee of the Folketing to approve that the state-owned DONG engage in activities in the North Sea at actually incalculable costs.

It has also turned out that Energy Minister Poul Nielson lacks natural flexibility, and there have far too often been mechanical errors, indicating that he does not keep things in order. He has difficulty cooperating with other parties, and, on the whole, it must be concluded that Energy Minister Poul Nielson has become a political burden to the government.

7262

CSO: 3106/88

BRIEFS

NATURAL GAS SUPPLY TALKS IN MOSCOW--A greek delegation has begun talks in Moscow, to be concluded on Friday, with officials of the Soviet organization "Soyuzmakheksport" [as published] on the possibilities of supplying our country with natural gas from Siberia. The delegation includes Mr Angelopoulos, president of the Greek Industrial and Mining Investments Company [ELEVME], a representative of the Aspropirgos state refineries and officials of the Industry and Energy Ministry. It has been learned that the government is facing the prospects of importing natural gas from the USSR positively, although at present, from the financial point of view, it considers the construction of the pipeline and distribution network which will cover the whole country as problematic--it is estimated to cost about \$1 billion. However, consideration is given to the possibility of building, as a first phase, the section of the pipeline that would link Plovdiv with Kavala, given the fact that the Soviet pipeline already goes as far as this town in the Bulgarian People's Republic. In any event, as a reliable source has clarified, the conclusion of the agreement will finally depend to a great extent on the talks being held in Moscow with the Soviet technical experts. [Text] [NC071523 Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 7 Apr 82 p 6]

NEW FORTHCOMING DRILLINGS--Kavala--A new program for drillings in search of oil will be initiated during the first days of May by the North Aegean Oil Company. The first phase of the program will extend to the middle of December and will include two drillings in the waters between Thasos and Nea Peramos. The data to be obtained from these two initial drillings will determine whether a third will be carried out. [Text] [Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 19 Mar 82 p 2]

CSO: 4621/277

BRIEFS

PETROLEUM FROM IRAQ--Economic Service--By comparison with 1980, Turkey's 1981 petroleum imports increased by 3.5 percent in terms of quantity and 22 percent in terms of value. Whereas Turkey imported 11.6 million tons of petroleum for \$2.7 billion in 1980, it purchased 11.7 million tons of crude petroleum for \$3.3 billion in 1981. Whereas the unrefined petroleum import price was \$241 in 1980, it rose to \$284.5 in 1981. In 1981, Iraq provided the largest proportion of our crude petroleum--48 percent. Heading the list in the area of our crude petroleum imports, Iraq, in 1981, rose for the first time to second place behind West Germany in the area of our exports as well. Whereas our exports to Iraq were \$134 million in 1980, they jumped to \$559 million in 1982. [Excerpt] [Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 24 Mar 82 p 5]

CSO: 4654/264

DGB CHAIRMAN CANDIDATE BREIT WINS APPROVAL FROM ALL SIDES

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 29 Mar 82 p 32

[Article: "A Certain Sacrifice--After Painful Confrontations Over Who Is To Succeed Vetter, the Unions Have Agreed on a Man They Had Wanted All Along"]

[Text] His colleagues were in a hurry. No sooner had the session of the DGB [German Labor Union Federation] had its final say on Wednesday [24 March] than the majority of the union leaders left the premises in a hurry.

They barely managed to get to their hotels for the start of the soccer game between Germany and Argentina. Only two of them stayed behind at the place of the meeting, the Bank fuer Gemeinschaft in Frankfurt, to talk with the waiting members of the press--Heinz Oskar Vetter, who is leaving his post of DGB chairman in May, and his presumed successor.

Hoarse and weary, Vetter explained what had been decided after 5 hours of discussion, namely, that Ernst Breit, chairman of the German Postal Union, is to be elected the new DGB chairman in May.

The decision was unanimous--as it had been once before earlier this year when the same question was on the agenda. As recently as early March, the union leaders had unanimously decided in favor of Alois Pfeiffer, who has now stepped back in favor of Breit.

After weeks of painful indecision, Pfeiffer gave up in light of the steady increase in opposition against his candidacy on the part of the individual unions. His colleagues had taken it amiss that, in order to save taxes, Pfeiffer, via Neue Heimat, had invested DM 100,000 in residential development in Berlin.

So far Pfeiffer has also been disinclined to explain in detail whether he had invested any money of his own. Late last week he told DER SPIEGEL that he had not yet made any transmittals to Berlin, saying: "My participation has been abandoned; a commitment in Berlin no longer exists."

After long "stupid discussion" (Pfeiffer) in public, the candidate stepped back the morning before the decisive meeting. When the DGB Executive met toward 1800 hours on the 36th floor of the Bank fuer Gemeinwirtschaft, no one knew as yet how to cope with what Vetter called a "difficult situation."

First the 16 chairmen of individual unions present withdrew to discuss the question as to who in fact should run for DGB chairman.

The atmosphere in the room was tense. Adolf Schmidt of the Miners and Energy Union, Karl Hauenschild of the Chemical Workers Union and Berthold Keller of the Textile Workers Union supported Pfeiffer and attacked his critics.

Particularly Ernst Haar of the Railroad Workers Union and Leonhard Mahlein of the Printers Union had to put up with harsh words. Both had let it be known in public that they preferred Breit to Pfeiffer. This incurred them the blame that they were making common cause with a malevolent press, with Hauenschild complaining that they "surely could not allow Alois to be its sacrificial lamb."

But when the senior person present, Rudolf Sperner of the Construction Workers Union, asked his colleagues one by one, in alphabetical order, just how their delegates would vote in Berlin, the situation was clear: Pfeiffer would no longer have received a majority.

Apparently Pfeiffer could now count only on the votes of the Construction Workers and the Food and Restaurant Workers unions and of the smallest union--the Gardening, Agricultural and Forestry Workers Union--because in the meantime Eugen Loderer's Metalworkers Union, which had zealously supported Pfeiffer, had also changed its mind.

The way Hans Mayr, substituting for the ill Loderer, the head of the Metalworkers Union, explained it, the Metalworkers Union had changed its stand because of the danger that an opposing candidate might be put forward in Berlin. "Ernst Breit is our man," said Mayr, thus ending any further discussion, because together with the government workers union the Metalworkers Union enjoys a comfortable majority at the national congress.

The DGB Executive then thanked Pfeiffer "with respect" for stepping down. "An outstanding attitude," said Vetter, full of praise, because, after all, Pfeiffer had "had to make a certain sacrifice." Pfeiffer, however, does not want to step back into the ranks completely but wants to run again for membership in the DGB Managing Executive in May.

In the person of Ernst Breit of the Postal Workers Union, the union people have now come up with a man whose candidacy they had explored for some time. Only after the senior postal official had refused the candidacy last year because his wife was seriously ill, had the men around Vetter agreed on Pfeiffer.

This time too Breit had to be urged to run, but he agreed when it was clear that no other candidate would be able to get the votes needed.

Correct official that he is, Breit left the room during the decisive meeting in order to enable his colleagues to discuss him without self-consciousness. Such gestures please the chairmen of the individual unions, who have little use for a DGB chairman eager for a public image.

Heinz Kluncker, chairman of the Public Services, Transport and Traffic union, feels he is "almost a friend" of the deliberate man from Dithmarschen. Loderer too values his postal colleague's quiet and appeasing manner.

The colleagues of the new candidate think it is almost certain that he will get a substantial majority at the national congress. He enjoys a reputation of being a convincing election winner. A couple of years ago he was confirmed in his post of chairman by 90 percent of the Postal Union members.

8790

CSO: 3103/380

SHORTAGES FORESEEN IN NEW BUDGET; INCOME TAX PROVISION

Papandreou Position 'Moderate'

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 14-15 Feb 82 p 1

[Article by N. Nikolaou]

[Excerpts] The offense of tax evasion is not being criminalized after all. Furthermore, the regular budget which is to be introduced in a few days into the Chamber of Deputies will be a deficit budget for the first time. These two principal decisions were made in the last session of the Government Economic Policy Council (KYSOP), at which Premier Andr. G. Papandreou sided with the views of the moderate officials in the government. These people had previously pointed out to him that: First: The restoration of the junta's Law 185/67 on criminalization of tax evasion (as is known, this had been introduced from America by the famous Androutsopoulos) would gravely damage the psychological climate and would give rise to extremely sharp reactions on the part of the productive classes. Moreover the existing legislation (Law 820/78 on evidence-of-income regulations) provides penalties severe enough to render new draconian laws superfluous. And second: An extensive and in-depth overtaxing of the economy particularly in a period of recession will have entirely negative consequences.

According to reports, the regular budget will be fixed at the level of approximately 590 billion drachmas with respect to expenditures, and for the first time its revenues will be less than this, since they will leave an uncovered deficit on the order of roughly 60 billion drachmas. A responsible government figure argued that the introduction right at the start of a deficit budget is indicative of the government's intention to guarantee honesty in its public-finance policy. And he recalled that last year the budget as submitted was balanced, but it ended up finally with a deficit of about 100 billion drachmas (the counter-argument on the part of the New Democracy Party is that this deficit is due to the decline in public revenues because of the earthquakes, to the over-stockpiling of petroleum, to the increase in debt installments for the public debt owing to the rise in the value of the dollar, and to the broader protection being given to agricultural products). Moreover, the parallel budgets (for investments, consumer goods, public enterprises, and so forth) also ended up with larger deficits than what had been estimated initially.

This victory of the moderate wing of the government is of particular significance because it emphasizes that Andr. G. Papandreou (who himself ultimately shapes the

economic policy of the country) is beginning to understand that overcoming the difficulties which he faces is to be done only by way of cooperation with all classes and through a curtailing of the aspirations of the hard-line wing for socio-economic transformations "here and now"!

Taxes on 'Luxuries'

Also approved in the latest session of the KYSOP were the general outlines of the tax policy which will be followed. It was agreed that new indirect taxes will be imposed on a number of products which are characterized as luxuries (beverages, jewelry, fabrics, stereophonic systems, passenger cars), while the stamp tax, the FKE [Business Turnover Tax], and the like will be increased. From these additional taxes, and upon being coupled with the increase in the profits tax and the imposition of the tax on real estate, the budget is expected to bring in about 50-60 billion drachmas.

Assets Estimated at 600 Billion Drachmas

According to the same reports the assets which will be put at the disposal of the economy this year are figured to be about 600 billion drachmas, of which about half will come from the increase in tax returns while the remainder will come from foreign borrowing and an increase in the money supply. Of these assets, about 350 billion drachmas will be taken in by the State and 250 billion drachmas will be received by the private sector of the economy.

According to government figures, this distribution ensures the following:

- To the private sector, the requisite capital for it to be motivated both in the direction of turning to account existing productive potential, and also in the direction of new investments.
- To the State, the chance to exercise a broader policy of protection for the farmers and wage-earners, and even to take the place of private enterprise in directly productive sectors--provided, of course, that the private sector is dragging its feet in these areas.

Economy Analyzed

Athens EPIKAIRA in Greek No 707, 18-24 Feb 82 p 28

[Article by G. Katsonis]

[Text] However incredible it may seem, inflation is decreasing. In the 2-month period of January-February it may finally show a total increase of only about 1 percent--something which, if it were to continue, would bring Greece into line with the European rates of 12-13 percent annually.

The Statistical Service has announced already that the index of consumer prices (with which we measure inflation) increased by only 1.1 percent in January, whereas in the corresponding months of 1981 and 1980 the increase was 2.4 and 2.9 percent. And it is expected that most likely February will show a negative change. The most

surprising aspect of all this is that January also marked the beginning of implementation of the increases in the telephone rates, water rates, and so forth (even though not all customers' bills show the corresponding extra charges). What, then, has happened?

"Do not forget that we are still in a recession, and this does have its manifestations," the proper minister explained the EPIKAIRA.

And it seems that this is the chief cause of the slowdown in inflation. If minor cases are excepted, no significant category of goods has had price increases. Business turnover either has fallen, or in any case has not increased, and this is despite the seasonal sales or even more permanent price reductions. "We are having to struggle to arouse the interest of the buyers," says one of the co-owners of a large department store in Athens in speaking about the market to the EPIKAIRA.

National Income

The recession, let us note, is a phenomenon which dominated the economy throughout 1981, during which time the national income remained absolutely stationary (zero increase). And as for the current year, for which the government's desire was to have a period of advancement begin, even if at only 1.5-2 percent, it does not seem that there will be a substantial change of climate for the time being.

Moreover, the index of retail sales for the previous year shows a smaller increase than that of the cost-of-living index. Something which reveals a corresponding decline in business turnover, in accordance with the difference between the two percentages (20 and 25 percent, approximately).

In addition to this decline in demand and the leveling off of the rate of inflation, the recession's manifestations also extend, in a positive way, so to speak, to the country's foreign-exchange balance. Also for the first time, after many years, our imports (aside from liquid fuels) not only do not show an increase but even exhibit a slight decrease during 1981, according to the foreign-exchange statistics of the Bank of Greece. Indeed, if also the international inflation is subtracted--that is, the increase in world prices for the corresponding goods--then the true volume of imports decreased a great deal.

Given also the expectation that world oil prices will be either stationary or in a downward direction for the whole of 1982, the chronic problem of the deficit nature of our country's balance of foreign payments should be mitigated. This is the second "positive" aspect of the recession, since an additional need does not arise for foreign loans, which for this year are being budgeted at last year's levels, as has already been written in the EPIKAIRA.

The Budget

From there on the side-effects begin. Besides unemployment, which as a rule is aggravated by the conditions of recession, also the downturn in economic activity and in transactions has immediate effects on the public revenues, which are supplied from the taxes on incomes (which are not increasing) and from the indirect taxes, which are taxes on transactions (which are now decreasing).

Thus, logically speaking one should not expect an increase in the public revenues, aside from the extra revenues which may arise from the fight against tax evasion. But the public expenditures are increasing. Wages and pensions for civil servants (around 45 percent of the total), expenditures for education, welfare and defense, and those expenses which are affected by inflation (procurements of commodities, and so forth) are expected to be greater, of course. This is how the public-finance deficit is created--or enlarged.

It is the reason why the government is "dragging its feet" on the imposition of new taxes (in reality on increasing taxes already in effect). The one thing which the government is trying to do is to avoid hurting those with lower incomes--or at least hurt them as slightly as possible. Even though with the substantial increase in the stamp duties it will "rain on the just and the unjust alike." But "it could not be otherwise," was the comment from a certain person who is keeping tabs on these events "from the inside."

But despite the new taxes, this year the regular budget will be appreciably in the red. If the information is true which leaked out following the latest session of the KYSOP last Friday, the gap will be at least 60 billion drachmas (compared to about 100 billion which last year's budget showed in the final statement). And this will be the first time in many years that a deficit regular budget has been submitted.

"But this is an application of the principle of sincerity," one of the drafters of the budget will say. "Last year's budget had been submitted as balanced, but in the end it showed a deficit of 100 billion drachmas, quite simply because it was not even balanced at the beginning."

Investments

And the expectations for a recovery are gradually being called in question, as is natural. A spoken readiness to do something is observed on many sides, but the materializations are somewhat slow in coming. The bill on incentives will be introduced perhaps one of these days, the problem industries are "holding back," thus intensifying their problematic character, and on the one hand new spectacular initiatives are not being ventured by the private parties but on the other hand the public agencies "want to but cannot" venture these, at least not for the time being.

Organizational problems, the lack of preparation, and distractions in the direction of expedient short-term solutions are causing obstacles and delays. This course is such that if it is not drastically checked, it will lead the present government also onto the path of disillusioned routinism.

12114

CSO: 4621/205

BRIEFS

U. S. PROFESSOR'S VISIT--An American professor is being invited by the government to discuss with it the country's economic problem. Lawrence Klein, professor at the University of Pennsylvania and a Nobel Prize winner in economics, will arrive today and will meet with Premier A. Papandreou. In this meeting they will have a discussion on subjects of economic expectations and economic policy. Early Friday afternoon, Mr Klein will speak in the meeting room of the Bank of Greece on the topic "Critique of Monetarism and the Experience of Keynesianism," and at 1800 hours he will give a lecture at the School of Law. [Excerpts] [Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 18 Feb 82 p 1] 12114

INCREASED SALARIES, WAGES--Increases of 38 percent on the base pay of workers retroactive to 1 January 1982 were decided on yesterday by the First Instance Arbitration Court. According to this decision: The minimum base wage is fixed at 825 drachmas, up from 600 drachmas, and the minimum base salary is fixed at 18,530 drachmas, up from 13,580 drachmas. Working hours are to be decreased from 42 to 41 per week. Three 3-year service bonuses at the level of 5 percent are to be granted. These increases will be paid as of 1 January 1982 and not from the date when the appeal to arbitration was made by the GSEE [Greek General Confederation of Labor], as is provided for by the relevant law. These base earnings are going to be adjusted on 1 May 1982 on the basis of the level of the price index as it will have been fixed by then, and a second increase, also based on the cost of living, will follow in the last 3-month period of 1982. The demand for the introduction of a 4-week vacation period and the doubling of the educational allowance will be settled by legislative decrees, while the 5-day work week will be introduced by way of the trade agreements. [Excerpt] [Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 12 Feb 82 p 1] 12114

CSO: 4621/205

CONDITIONS REPORTEDLY NOT YET RIGHT FOR CONVERTIBLE LIRA

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 5 Feb 82 p 5

[Report by Nursun Alev]

[Text] Ankara--A report submitted to the National Security Council evaluates the present currency exchange system in Turkey and puts forth conditions for "transition into convertibility."

Noting that the "final aim of a realistic currency exchange policy is convertibility," the report lists the minimum conditions necessary for transition into convertibility. The report airs the following views: "A completely free foreign trade system cannot be contemplated without building a sound foundation for an export-based development strategy...Useable foreign currency reserves in Turkey are still too low...The inflation rate in Turkey is higher than the average inflation rate of countries we trade with...At this time it will be proper to continue efforts to liberalize foreign trade..."

Preconditions for Convertibility

The report lists the following preconditions for transition into convertibility:

"It must be possible to use the currency for any purpose without being subject to any limitations; it must be possible to exchange the currency for any other currency at any time desired; it must be possible to transfer the currency to any location desired; it must be possible to use and exchange the currency at any time desired at the established and announced rate."

Turkish Economic Conditions

The report also evaluates the state of the Turkish economy and says:

"A completely free foreign trade system cannot be contemplated without building a sound foundation for an export-based development strategy and without expanding the import quota system--which is the fundamental characteristic of our industry sector--into capital and intermediate goods in a manner which will give priority to local resources.

"In the event the Turkish lira becomes convertible the effect of capital movements will be important in closing the deficit in the balance of payments. Interest rates will have a positive effect in bringing foreign capital into the country and in developing the balance of infusion and effusion of capital in such a way that the infusion of capital into the country will be dominant. This, in turn, will increase the demand for Turkish currency in the international money market and hence raise the value of the currency. However, if a transition is made into convertibility, the effusion of Turkish currency abroad will progressively intensify as a result of the ease of transfer currency abroad freely and the absence of any foreign exchange controls. This, in turn, will mean a loss of value in the exchange rate of the Turkish currency and as a result the valve action expected from capital movements in closing the current deficits in the balance of payments will not be realized.

"If capital movements cannot remedy the balance of payments deficits, it will be necessary, as a precondition for the implementation of a floating currency system, to keep foreign exchange reserves at adequate levels. Low levels of useable foreign exchange in Turkey will eliminate the effectiveness of the floating system.

"The current inflation rate in Turkey is higher than the average inflation rate of the countries we trade with. Differences between inflation rates in Turkey and those in foreign countries will hamper the establishment of trust in the Turkish currency and this, in turn, will possibly cause unnecessary fluctuations in the value of our currency abroad."

9588

CSO: 4654/181

DEPREZ ON PROBLEMS, FUTURE OF WALLOON SOCIAL CHRISTIANS

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 17 Feb 82 pp 16-19

[Interview with PSC President Gerard Deprez by Frans Verleyen and Johan Struye: "President Deprez Speaks About his Party -- PSC, all of them Christians"; date and place not specified; passages enclosed in slantlines, printed in italics]

[Text] What is a Christian in politics? According to the new PSC [Social Christian Party (Walloon)] President Gerard Deprez, 39 years old, the Social Christian Party is not the political extension of the parishes, his party does not speak in the name of the Walloon Christians as such, and consequently they do not all have to belong to it. What difference does it make whether you are a Christian or not if you are a worker at Fabelta and the plant closes? There is no need for the political parties to invent human values. The people do that themselves, and then they apply their value scale to a commitment, of which a political party is one of the vectors.

It is partly because Wilfried Martens was wrong about the kind of reaction the new PS [Socialist Party (Walloon)] President Guy Spitaels would have to his emergency plan, that his fourth administration fell last year. If he makes a mistake about the character of Gerard Deprez, then his fifth government will not hold either. Indeed, according to its president, the PSC is not a member of the government to find a shelter or to swallow someone else's policy for that matter. For the time being, this man from Bastogne in the Ardennes, living in Ottignies, in Walloon Brabant, is the last in a series of spectacularly rejuvenated party leaders to appear in the country. This tall, taciturn young man, who for years took notes next to Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb, turns out to be an eloquent, nervous, incisively arguing and properly driven politician, who gives a strong impression of openness to the new signals in society. However, in the area of /ecology/ (no technological change without social change), of /pacifism/ (only those who are absolute conscientious objectors are real pacifists), or of /abortion/ (the right to protection originates with the person himself), he does not deviate a single step from the well known positions of his party.

Since 1970, PSC presidents have been elected by all the members by means of a written ballot. Thirty-six percent of the 65,865 members wanted to cast their vote. Of those, 18,287 voted for the young party official, who was trained as a sociologist at the UCL [Catholic University of Louvain]. With this 77.62 percent from his own ranks, Deprez was elected by more people than any other Belgian party has ever brought together in a congress. However, this overwhelming representativeness did not relieve Gerard Deprez last week of the problem that a large group within the Walloon Christian Labor Movement [MOC] now really wants to set up its own political group.

Question: Why did the PSC lose the elections of 8 November?

Gerard Deprez: What we had there was a defeat of /Christian democracy/ as such, because the CVP [Social Christian Party (Flemish)] was also hard hit. This was not completely unexpected. For 2 years, all polls gave us a loss of a few percentage points. It was going on. Whereas, thanks to the Tindemans effect, the CVP had still made progress in the European elections of 1979, we had already suffered a setback. I see at least three reasons for this. I am convinced that in the eyes of our voters we are supposed to be the strong party, that the Christian democrats are supposed to set the tone in political life. But what did they see? We, who were supposed to be the moving force in the government action, were just standing by. We gave an impression of being /followers/. We did hold all the major departments, but the socialists could block everything. Secondly, our voters cannot accept our being lax in managing the state. From the socialists, they could expect some careless action in the management of the state or could expect that they might not respect the institutions, but we are /not/ allowed to do that. Hence, the prevailing instability did not work to the disadvantage of the socialists, but to ours.

And then, thirdly, there are the things that happened. The manner in which the Martens IV administration was launched is something I /never/ want to experience again. There was its plan for 33 billion francs in savings. There was scepticism; deliberate speculation against the franc was set in motion. The National Bank panicked and the prime minister drew up a plan. All Christian democrat ministers said that they agreed; the socialists didn't. But less than 10 days later, we once again had a government with the same Christian democrat ministers and with the same socialists. Only Wilfried Martens was gone and that plan was no longer talked about. How would that have come across? At that point, we were on the threshold of unworthiness.

Specifically for the PSC, there was a lack of credibility then. Forty days prior to election day, when the polls showed us falling 5.4 percent behind, I was hastily appointed political secretary of the party. I couldn't count the telephone calls I received from people who assured me that they still wanted to vote PSC, but one of them did not, under any circumstances, want to vote for a member of CEPIC [Political Study Center of Christian Independents and Cadres], and another didn't want his vote to go in favor of /social democracy/. There must be an end to this now, or the PSC will fall apart completely as a party. We didn't even project the image of a party any longer, but of a cartel.

Question: And yet, it was not that long ago that then President Nothomb announced that the PSC would overtake the socialists in Wallonia as the largest party.

Deprez: We had won the 1974 elections. With a 5 percent increase, 1977 had been a huge victory, while the socialists in the opposition had only gained 3 percent. We had also won the municipal elections of 1976, and we kept advancing in 1978. The whole swing which brought us to a representation of 26 percent of the Walloon voters originally arose from the Louvain question. In the northern part of the country there is not enough awareness of how traumatic Louvain-68 had been. The whole FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] resulted from it, and so did the rebirth of the PSC. Politically speaking, I also come from that Louvain. I liked being there, and I was /driven away/. I was a boy from the Ardennes, full of goodwill, who was studying in his country in Louvain and who was learning Dutch. I was not a party member, but a Christian democrat. I noticed that my party was divided on this issue, and that the dominant wing imposed its will. Of course, I do understand the Flemish dynamics of that time, but you have to realize that the "Walloon out" slogan determined the behavior of my generation in the seventies. It was Nothomb's main talent to be able to combine all this behind him. Whereas the 1971 elections left us with only 14 members in parliament, only the fourth party in Wallonia, as of 1972 we once again became a party of young people. That which had been too much of a party of notables became, from congress to congress, a movement structured on the basis of doctrine. In this respect, we benefited enormously from Leo Tindemans. His administration succeeded in merging the municipalities and already pushed the moderation theme through under Oleffe-Herman. That administration enjoyed a certain popularity, from which the PSC derived a certain credibility.

As of 1977 things started to go less well. The Egmont plan was a last chance for a favorable kind of institutional development. Andre Cools' propaganda struck home. Now, we lost as much with the Tindemans image as we had gained before. Furthermore, a reaction emerged from the party ranks against the center-left image projected by the party leadership. We were the gang of four: Nothomb, Hansenne, Langhendries and myself. The /families/ structured themselves against our centralism. In fact, we had won everything there was to win, and now something more was required. The party needed a new president with a new style, an integrator who could reconcile the aspirations of the members of CEPIC with our Walloon image and our credibility among the young. Nothomb couldn't do it; actually, /nobody/ could have done it. When I opposed Paul Vanden Boeynants in 1979 my candidature didn't really make sense. At the time, I was only perceived as the president of the line which caused all those problems. The oppositions within the party have remained the problem.

Question: How do you get out of that now? Your image seems very colored by the Christian labor movement.

Deprez: I am still the same as I was 10 years ago. I have never owned a union membership card or been a member of any organization of the /families/. I am opposed to the /families/. I now expect them to restructure themselves on the basis of a /right to factions/, which the party will define. Because

there is no such thing as a party without tendencies either, and would not even be desirable. The right to factions is an obvious constant in a people's party. As far as the CEPIC problem is concerned, it comes down to a core of a few people for whom there is no place in the PSC. If they don't leave voluntarily, then I will demand measures as a result of which they will no longer be able to carry out their maneuvers within the PSC. It involves a handful of individuals who, through dubious methods and unacceptable views, have misused and diverted a movement which had originally been set up by honest people with worthy objectives.

Question: Should we stick the initials VDB [Vanden Boeynants] on that?

Deprez: On the contrary, when Vanden Boeynants presided over CEPIC he managed to keep this misplaced propensity for the right under control.

Question: But, sociologically speaking, those obscurantists you are denouncing came precisely from the circles surrounding Vanden Boeynants. You must surely know the world of Vanden Boeynants, don't you?

Deprez: Well, I do /not/ know that world. I have worked with him as party president, with a man who like no other among the politicians has the courage to pursue the path of his logic to the very end, with no concessions. One easily forgets that as a politician this man has had to make quite a number of difficult decisions in his life, and that he did it with great firmness of principle and constancy. Just think about his UAB [expansion unknown] list in 1970 in Brussels, for which he did not have the approval of the party.

Question: But how damaging did this flair for sensationalism turn out to be for Belgian democracy? In the last 10 or 15 years there hasn't been another Belgian politician who has been mentioned so often in relation to so many questions.

Deprez: On my /honor/ I can testify to the fact that nobody has ever been able to give me a single factual datum for which you could have cast a stone at Vanden Boeynants. You always hear them say that we will see, but /nothing ever/ comes of it. Now, it seems inevitable to me that any government official having anything to do with either the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of Public Works, will have to deal with insinuations. Liberal and socialist ministers as well.

Question: Willy De Clercq once said that Christian democracy will go to bed with anyone it wants to. First with the left, and then with the right. Everywhere in Europe there is anxiety among Christian democrats about whether it is still possible in a crisis period to have a party which advocates a harmonious model and the public interest above the various classes. Now that things are so tough again, especially in Wallonia, how can you stand there so tongue-tied?

Deprez: However, the aspect of our permanence in government is tied to this cohabitation. Because there doesn't seem to be any way in our country to avoid our being part of the government. When we were excluded for a while between 1954 and 1958, we were pulled back in through the front door. The trap that we cannot avoid is that the others have a way of choosing us for their partner.

They, those others, simply do /not/ want to govern together. That mutual radicalism of the liberals and the socialists against each other is precisely their tactical detour to break us up. They constantly try to make the Christian democrats accomplices in a policy of which we are never the moving force. They want to make us /followers/ in order to be able to even up the score with us. Because when Spitaels does not want to join the liberals, he knows full well that he is strengthening his left side. The liberals fatten their right side by rejecting the socialists. Both then reach out to us and say that we are the /bedmate/. This is why I now state that we cannot remain in the administration if we are not the center of gravity and the moving force of its policy.

Question: Is there a future left for a party which is not the party representing the interest of a specific class?

Deprez: Having been trained as a sociologist I cannot stress strongly enough the impression Marx made on me. But his analysis of the inevitability of the class struggle leads him to the conclusion that there is no other way than to base political life on this. However, the fact that there is antagonism between the classes is not reason enough for me to turn it into the basis and principle of the structure of society. That is an important option which is not taken solely by the Christian democrats however. I have noted this in several countries. The FRG is governed without resistance from the center. Helmut Schmidt is a social democrat who stands more in the center than several of our Christian democrats. In England we are currently witnessing the advent of a new political center, which represents a joining of social democrats and social reformers and which is pushing the Labor Party further to the left and the conservatives even further to the right. Belgium can find an analogous lesson in the election results from the early crisis years in the thirties. At that time, the socialists suddenly became the largest party in the country. Hence, it does happen that times of crisis produce a propensity for the /simplification/ of positions, and that a radicalization is expressed through the options. However, at that time the political scales were balanced again, and we will also pull through. As a matter of fact, you cannot manage a social and economic system based on the extremes. When our liberals state that our enterprises must be freed and that there should be /less/ state management, then I can go along with that part way. But their point of departure that only the fullest elbow room can provide a solution is extreme and untrue. Such a solution would only produce the wildest and most prehistoric capitalism, and that is not a solution. To a certain extent, we can also say that Mitterrand's France is being governed from the center. I am disregarding the aspect of the nationalizations for now, because that isn't even relevant. Those nationalizations serve as symbols for the masses; aside from that, those banks will perhaps simply be managed like good banks. And in our market economy it makes little difference whether they are public or private enterprises. I prefer to see a state owned Renault than Cockerill-Sambre. I am not at all allergic to public companies, as long as I have the guarantee that the state sector will be run according to the logic of the market in which it must operate. The question, alas, is that in our country we are not capable of giving public initiative the necessary autonomy to achieve results. Politicization is the pathology of our system. One element of the steel misery is that now a managing director will be appointed soon. In spite of all my regard for Alderman

Vandebosche of Seraing, I do not, alas, have any confidence in him as captain of industry in an enterprise of that size. This is where party influence is really at work.

Question: Together with Frank Swaelen, Guy Verhofstadt and President Michel, you are against particracy. Do we find ourselves dreaming now? If all particrats are against particracy, how can it still exist then?

Deprez: But what does this mean? If there were no particracy, and tomorrow we were to set up a national bank of which only 40 percent would be in the hands of French speakers, then I would immediately demand that particracy intervene. Such an action would affect the balance of the state. If the administration does not govern firmly, then the parties must stand up. It is up to the parties to set the principles on which the government ministers take their options. At this time, a new governor must be appointed for the National Bank. Three issues are involved here. First of all, what is the nature of that job, and what kind of man should be considered? Should he be a politician or a technocrat? A Fleming or a French speaker? Could the French speakers actually afford for such a man, within the balance of a state which is already predominantly Belgo-Flemish, to be a Fleming again? Finally, what would be the intentions of such a candidate in terms of monetary policy, which is after all the key piece of the recovery policy? If the parties have formed some kind of picture, then the final arbitration should take place within the government. That is not a question of particracy, but of the functioning of the state. We are not interfering in the decisions of the administration, but it is still normal for us to weigh the intentions of our ministers. Because opposition leader Spitaels has decided that one of the weaknesses of this administration lies in the fact that it does not have a majority in the southern part of the country equal to that in the northern part, and that another weakness is that it strives for a policy of social regression, it is important that the ministers themselves do not, inadvertently or otherwise, precisely provoke a confrontation on those issues. This is what the party watches over. As PSC then, I am telling the ministers that the overall package of measures they have to develop, must be balanced. /Simultaneously./

8463

CSO: 3105/116

BRIEFS

FRENCH PREMIER'S VISIT--Foreign Trade Minister Michel Jobert was to return to Paris this Saturday, 3 April, in the evening after his visit to Canada which he ended with a visit to Quebec. The French minister, who had talks with Quebec Prime Minister Levesque, opened the French center for promoting technological and industrial cooperation in Montreal. The Quebec counterpart in Paris was recently opened. He also discussed the high-speed train with Mr Jean Drapeau, Montreal's mayor, who is considering that means of transport for linking Montreal with New York (600 km) one day. Mr Jobert's visit also made it possible to prepare for the visit which Mr Mauroy will make to Canada at the end of the month. The premier will be the Federal Government's guest from 21 to 25 April, after which he will visit Quebec from 25 to 27 April. The dispute between the Quebec and federal authorities on the possibility of an Ottawa minister's accompanying Mr Mauroy on his visit to the French-speaking province has been settled. It has been learned that Mr Trudeau is not insisting on such a presence since the French premier, in keeping with the protocol established during Mr Barre's visit in 1979, will first have made a visit to the Federal Government. [Excerpt] [PM081059 Paris LE MONDE in French 4-5 Apr 82 p 16]

CSO: 3100/521

FOREIGN MINISTER ROLANDHIS ADDRESSES NONALIGNED MEETING

NC071742 Nicosia PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICE in English 7 Apr 82 p 1

["Text" of 7 April speech by Cyprus Foreign Affairs Minister Nikolaos Rolandhis at the extraordinary session of the Nonaligned Coordination Bureau for Palestine meeting in Kuwait]

[Text] Mr Chairman: The fact that the Coordinating Bureau of the Nonaligned Countries is meeting here in extraordinary session in order to discuss the Palestinian question is indicative of the seriousness with which the non-aligned movement views and approaches this issue.

A meeting such as this one gives courage and provides concrete proof of the determination of the nonaligned movement and of the international community in general, to spare no effort when the freedom, fundamental rights and dignity of men are concerned whether in Palestine, Cyprus or anywhere in the world.

It also serves as a reminder to the international community of intolerable and flagrant violations of the United Nations Charter, General Assembly resolutions and the norms of international law.

Such a meeting, Mr Chairman, also serves to remind the international community of the inability of the United Nations Organisation to ensure the implementation of its own decisions. And there are numerous decisions of the General Assembly, concerning the Palestine problem, the Cyprus problem, the Namibian problem and many others, which have not been implemented.

The present meeting, Mr Chairman, serves to focus attention on all the above. And it is most appropriate that the bureau is now meeting at ministerial level, with the purpose of adopting practical measures on the question of Palestine. I sincerely hope that this will set a precedent for the future. Because if no practical measures are adopted for dealing with the Palestine question, with the Cyprus problem and with other international problems, whose very existence offends all concepts of international justice, then the nonaligned movement will not be able to claim that it fully serves the purposes for which it exists.

Mr Chairman, the position of my government on the question of Palestine is well known and has been reiterated on several occasions at the United Nations and other international fora, as well as on the bilateral level, and also during contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which maintains an office in Cyprus.

The government and people of Cyprus have given ample proof of their support for the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and of their support for the free exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

Our view has always been that the question of Palestine is the core of the problem of the Middle East. It is only by a comprehensive and just solution of the Palestine question that lasting peace may prevail in the region. Our position continues to be that any solution to the Palestine question should ensure:

- a. The complete withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories.
- b. The return of the Palestinian people to their homes and properties.
- c. The free exercise by the Palestinian people of their right to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty.

My government, Mr Chairman, strongly supports the right of the refugees and the displaced to return to their ancestral homes and lands. As in the case of our Palestinian brothers, one third of the people of Cyprus have also been forced to leave their ancestral homes and lands and are now refugees in their own country. No passage of time can affect or alienate the right of refugees, anywhere, to return to their ancestral homes and lands.

As I have already said, Mr Chairman, my government has given ample proof of our support for the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It is for this reason, we believe, that for the achievement of a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem, it is imperative that the Palestinian people, through their representatives, the PLO, should be parties to any negotiations concerning Palestine. Our position has always been that the future and destiny of a people cannot be discussed in their absence.

Thus, any agreements and treaties concluded without the participation of the Palestinian leadership, agreements and treaties which could affect the future of the Palestinian people, their inalienable rights and the state of the occupied Palestinian territories, can have no validity.

The foreign policy of the government of Cyprus, Mr Chairman, has always been guided by the fundamental principles of international justice. Our position on the Palestine question and other problems in the various international fora provides ample proof of this. Thus, our full-hearted support for the Palestinian people is not simply based on sentiments directed towards a

brotherly people who are facing many similar problems with us. It is based on internationally recognized principles of justice which have been violated.

The determination of all of us at this meeting to adopt practical measures for ensuring implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions and for the strengthening of our assistance to the struggle of the Palestinian people to attain and freely exercise their inalienable rights is encouraging. And it must set a precedent in dealing with all the problems which the non-aligned movement has taken up.

We, in Cyprus, are struggling for the past eight years for the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity of our country, a big part of which is under the occupation of the armed forces of Turkey. Repeated United Nations resolutions and nonaligned declarations demanding the withdrawal of the Turkish troops and safeguarding the rights of the refugees have remained unimplemented in exactly the same way in which there has been no compliance with resolutions on Palestine.

The intercommunal talks, through which the internal--and not the international--aspect of the Cyprus problem is discussed and negotiated, have not yielded hitherto any results of substance. The Turkish side relies on its military supremacy and does not show any signs of flexibility whatsoever. We are continuing our efforts for a peaceful solution through negotiations with perseverance and patience. But we want you to know that we very badly need your solidarity and support. No country can bear alone, these days, the rigours of international life and the tensions which are its main characteristic. This applies much more to small and defenceless nations, like Cyprus, which have tasted already injustice in a brutal way.

The nonaligned movement enjoys international respect and represents a power to be reckoned with, because it stands for principles which are recognized and respected. Our determination to adopt concrete measures for the realization of these principles will give more substance to our work and will add to the credibility, the respect and the strength of our movement, to the benefit of each and every one of us in this hall.

CSO: 4600/386

NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA FDP AIMS TO RETURN TO LANDTAG

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Mar 82 p 12

/Article by Lothar Bewerunge, datelined Duesseldorf, 22 March: "Moellemann Advances"/

/Text/ At its Land party congress in Siegen last weekend the North Rhine-Westphalia FDP was still unaware of the Lower Saxony election result. However, this Land party federation, strongest in membership, was governed by only one thought: How can we manage to return to the Landtag in Duesseldorf, and what is the best approach to the problem? In the summer of 1980 the party failed to obtain any seats in the Landtag, achieving only 4.9 percent of the vote. Since then the long lauded harmony between the Bonn and Duesseldorf FDP has ceased to exist. Once upon a time, led by Willi Weyer, the North Rhine-Westphalia FDP was the springboard for Genscher, Lambsdorff, Baum, Verheugen, Frau Funcke and others, that is for a large part of the Bonn leadership. It is therefore highly motivated amidst the political wilderness to reflect about its function and to try and regain impetus with some important personnel decisions.

The most noticeable result of Siegen was the clear success of Bundestag deputy Juergen Moellemann, victor in the contest for the job as deputy to land chairman Burkhard Hirsch (an office vacant due to Frau Funcke's resignation). He defeated his competitor Klaus Gaertner. The two men had entered this contest (considered a trial run for the Land chairmanship that is assumed to fall vacant at some time between the end of 1983 and spring 1984). The winner would then have the responsibility as the FDP "top candidate" to lead the party back into the North Rhine-Westphalia Landtag in 1985. The 400 delegates knew this; as the extensive discussion showed, they classified Moellemann more or less in the bourgeois-liberal camp and Gaertner more on the social-liberal wing and arrived at their decision accordingly. It would be premature and unjustified to describe this as a "shift to the right" by the Land federation. However, it was clearly revealed in Siegen that this Land federation intends initially to redefine itself as an autonomous force, independent of any coalition preferences--especially because there is no reason for haste. The attacks on Rau's SPD Land government in Duesseldorf, its "financial chaos," its "budget disaster," were so severe that it was hard to believe that this FDP helped to construct the billion high debt mountain side by side with the SPD in Duesseldorf. Loyalty to the coalition in Bonn but an open mind and complete freedom of decision for Duesseldorf--that seems about the fairest description of the image the party offered in Siegen.

In addition to Moellemann's election (he will now devote all his efforts to his new duties in Land politics), the congress sent out some other signals of this reconsideration. Last March's extraordinary congress, dominated by the left liberals, was unanimously condemned as having damaged FDP interests. This condemnation went so far that even Federal Interior Minister Baum used two of his contributions to the discussion to cautiously move off the extraordinary congress decisions. The amplitude of this rejection may also have been the reason for Moellemann's defeat of parliamentary manager Gaertner who had been present in Cologne. Together with Genscher, Lambsdorff and Verheugen, Moellemann had branded the Cologne congress as "the wrong approach"--and earned loud applause.

Another indication: As the first Land party, the North Rhine-Westphalian FDP elected a representative of the Young Liberals to the new Land executive. The Young Democrats were not even given an opportunity to stand in Siegen. Lambsdorff had claimed that the party could no longer afford two youth organizations, it would have to decide for one--and that one the Young Liberals. In this North Rhine-Westphalia FDP his assertion would certainly have gotten a majority if there had been a vote. Interesting prospects are thereby unveiled for the next federal party congress that will, among other duties, have to decide this issue. Genscher may continue to consider the North Rhine-Westphalia FDP his most loyal followers. No one here disputes his foreign and defense policies. Not to be missed by the Bonn politicians was the delegates rejection of Borm and his doctrine of nuclear decoupling from the United States and of Frau Schuchardt and her appeal to "create many Colognes."

Nevertheless the North Rhine-Westphalia FDP has not yet totally committed itself to Moellemann as the future Land chairman. He himself is quite aware of that. In recent months Moellemann has done his best to make people forget his image as an alert ad-man and brash newcomer. He promised the party to be more sober, to continue learning and to sacrifice his Bundestag career whenever the time was ripe for North Rhine-Westphalia. Every party congress likes to listen to so much self-abnegation and readiness for sacrifice--whether it is assumed or genuine. In the opinion of many delegates, "let the kid prove himself."

Before the Land party congress met, Hirsch had stated quite clearly that he had no wish to return to Land politics after 5 years as Duesseldorf interior minister from 1975-1980. In Siegen the party indicated that it agreed with his decision by reducing the vote of confidence expressed by his reelection for 2 years from 83 percent to 66 percent, and by beginning to look around for new blood. Several large party districts such as the Rhine, the Ruhr and the Muenster districts seem to have felt that reorganization was not proceeding fast enough. Genscher, on the other hand, an attentive observer with a lot of time on his hands in Siegen, gave the impression that events were moving rather too quickly for his liking. He would prefer to have the personnel decisions of Siegen considered "normal" and by no means "preliminary decisions" for Duesseldorf, and certainly not linked with speculations about a coalition with the CDU and against the SPD.

He is of course right insofar as, despite the rebellious mood in the North Rhine-Westphalia FDP, the party will have to keep in mind the realities of the "political calendar": First there will be a series of Landtag elections in other Laender, to be followed by the 1984 Bundestag election. North Rhine-Westphalia will not go to the polls until spring 1985. This means a lot of time and a lot of patience for this FDP, and there is hardly anything in view that--to use Genscher's favorite expression--could be called "calculable" at present.

LONG-TERM EFFECT OF LOWER SAXONY ELECTION ON FDP VIEWED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 24 Mar 82 p 12

[Article by Karl Feldmeyer, datelined Bonn, 23 March: "Kohl's Hidden Ultimatum"]

[Text] Nobody ever doubted that the outcome of the election in Lower Saxony would have more than local significance. It was not to be foreseen, though, that it would directly affect federal politics. CDU chairman Kohl indicated quite casually how it is possible to turn a just finished and another imminent Landtag election into a political ultimatum at federal level without actually describing it as such--indeed almost without attracting attention.

Who knows whether he would have said anything at all if he had not been asked why he did not--in view of the SPD's desperate situation--urge new elections for the Bundestag now. As it is we do know: Should the coalition stay in government in Bonn, and should the CDU win the Hesse Landtag election on 26 September, the Union will promptly call for the dissolution of parliament and for early elections, as happened before, in 1972. Normally this kind of demand does not much trouble the government in power, because the constitution firmly states that a government is unassailable as long as it commands a majority of Bundestag deputies. Without the cooperation of at least one of the two coalition parties, all opposition efforts to obtain new elections are quite in vain.

However, Kohl addressed himself to the FDP. Calling for elections from 27 September on also implies that the CDU is no longer interested in forming a coalition with the FDP in the current Bundestag legislative term. That may come as a surprise, because the leader of the opposition is widely assumed to base his strategy on an alliance with the FDP. In this context the Free Democrats are the wooed, the CDU and the CSU the wooers. This view of the situation has so far prevailed even lately that a great deal of skepticism greeted Kohl's assurance that it made no sense to court the FDP because that party would leave the coalition with the SPD only if continuation of this coalition threatened its very survival.

It is worth while to recall this phrase uttered at the CDU's Hamburg party congress. What exactly makes for the FDP's political survival? Its program is not crucial; the FDP's political importance is based on two considerations: First that it manages the 5 percent hurdle, in other words that its parliamentary survival is ensured; second its ability to provide the majority necessary for government for at least one of the major parties, SPD or CDU/CSU. It is one of the ironies of the FDP's political fate that, Sunday last, it enjoyed the rebirth of its Landtag fraction and, at

the same time, had to discover that the fraction is irrelevant to the future politics in the Land. The 5.9 percent achieved by the FDP are of little use to the two major parties, CDU and SPD, nor would these parties have been damaged by a 4.8 percent result for the FDP. The CDU gained the absolute majority and may govern alone, regardless whether the FDP does or does not hold seats in the Landtag. The SPD, on the other hand, is in a minority with or without the FDP. In Lower Saxony the FDP did return to the Landtag but did not regain its old function. It neither bestows nor refuses the majority, nor is it indispensable for governing the Land. On the contrary, it is altogether irrelevant. Its political impact therefore corresponds strictly to its share of the vote--5.9 percent. Formerly a central political fact, it has become marginal. Already the Greens are politically more important in the Landtag.

Whoever is aware of these facts must recognize the significance of Kohl's--implied--statement of Monday last that, after the Hesse election, the CDU would no longer be interested in forming a coalition with the FDP in Bonn. Almost more than the SPD the FDP must fear that the Lower Saxony election result will be largely repeated in Hamburg and Hesse. The entry of the Greens in both Land parliaments is more than likely, and for the FDP this means the loss of its importance as the provider of majorities in alliance with the SPD. The Hamburg FDP does not wish to join with the CDU to rule the Land, and in Hesse it could well happen that the CDU might not need a coalition partner to command a majority. Nor can fundamentally different results be expected in the Landtag elections of next year and the year after, nor at the 1984 Bundestag election. The Greens may be expected to gain seats in all parliaments, and for the FDP this means the loss of its prime function.

Prospects are rather better for the FDP as the partner of the CDU. Not only because the FDP offers itself as the CDU's natural partner wherever the Union provides the strongest fraction but lacks the absolute majority, but also because--for well considered reasons--the CDU might be quite ready to share the responsibility of government with the Free Democrats even where it could rule alone by virtue of an absolute majority.

The FDP must take all this into account when Kohl mentions early elections. Indeed such reflections are all too likely in case the CDU wins the Hesse election--not so much as a consequence of the Union's subsequent two thirds majority in the Bundesrat than due to the demoralizing effects of such a result on the coalition. On the other hand, in this situation early elections could mean more than just the risk of serious losses. As nobody can exclude the possibility of the Greens obtaining more than 5 percent in Bonn, the FDP is threatened with losing its importance for a government alliance with the SPD and even the CDU/CSU. Consequently nobody could be more interested than the FDP to banish the danger of early elections and show itself attractive and indispensable in a new government coalition so as to approach the voters in 1984 with a better chance. The long-standing distribution of roles between CDU/CSU and FDP--woolers and wooed--no longer exists. The situation has been reversed. No wonder CDU chairman Kohl seems neither impatient nor challenging. At the present moment time is on his side.

POLL SHOWS CONTINUED HIGH SUPPORT FOR KOIVISTO

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 14 Mar 82 p 7

[Article: "Koivisto-Uusitalo Government Worth a Seven"]

[Text] President Mauno Koivisto received a rather high rating from Finnish citizens immediately at the beginning of his term for his suitability for the duties of the President of the Republic. In a public opinion poll concerning the new president, Koivisto received an average rating of 8.39.

The poll indicates that women gave Koivisto a slightly higher rating than the men. The best ratings came from working class leftwing voters over 50 years of age.

The poll conducted by the Taloustutkimus Oy [Economic Research Company] was held in February when Mauno Koivisto had just assumed the office of president and when government negotiations were being conducted. Only a small portion of the interviews was conducted during Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa's government.

In the poll it was asked "how well or poorly does Mauno Koivisto meet the goals and expectations you have for the president? Answer according to the rating 4--10, familiar from the system used in schools.

"And how well or poorly did Urho Kekkonen meet the goals and expectations you have for a good president.

"And how well or poorly does the current government meet the goals and expectations you have for a good government?"

Government Received Only a Seven

President Koivisto received the best ratings from those over 50 years of age, a rating of 8.63. Younger voters between the ages of 18 and 24 gave an average rating of 8.11. Koivisto's rating from those belonging to the working class was 8.52 and from farmers 8.09. The rating was the highest in Southern Finland and the lowest in Northern Finland.

Those who voted for SDP candidates in the electoral elections gave a rating of 8.83. Those who voted for the Conservative Party gave a rating of 7.87 and those who voted for the Center Party a rating of 7.89.

According to the poll President Urho Kekkonen's overall rating was 9.02. His average rating in all groups was generally high, but the highest among those between the ages of 18 and 24 and among workers living in Northern Finland who voted for the SKDL and the Center Party.

The average rating received by the government was 7.05. On the average the government received the highest rating from women and respondents over the age of 50. Among the various professions the government received the highest rating from farmers and the lowest rating from intellectual workers. Those who voted for the Center Party considered the government to be worth a 7.32 rating and those who voted for the Conservative Party gave a rating of 6.58.

A total of 951 individuals over the age of 18 was interviewed in the poll.

10576

CSO: 3107/92

FINLAND PREPARING INITIATIVES TO BREAK CSCE IMPASSE

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 13 Mar 82 p 9

[Article: "CSCE Interruption Has Activated Finland"]

[Text] The suspension of the follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe did not cause panic in the Finnish delegation yesterday since at least in theory the meeting has good prospects for the fall. In accordance with its threat in February neutral Switzerland proposed that the meeting be suspended until 9 November, but hopes for a better continuation were aroused by the fact that the premise for the discussion at that time will be the resolution proposed in December by the neutral and nonaligned countries.

In addition, it was agreed that in November only the open portions of the proposal will be discussed. Approximately one-fifth of the proposal is disputed and these points also include a proposal for a European disarmament conference.

Finland Will Do Groundwork

Finland apparently will strive to play a more effective role for improving the conditions in November. According to Under State Secretary Keijo Korhonen Finland will try to clear the air in bilateral discussions with various countries in Helsinki as well as in other capitol cities.

The United States as well as all the other member countries of NATO immediately supported Switzerland's proposal on Friday to suspend the meeting.

The objective is to provide an 8-month "creative interval" on the basis of the December proposal. Ordinarily a human creative interval in nature requires 9 months, but the possible agreement on limiting medium-range missiles in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva may provide new impetus for the follow-up meeting of the CSCE.

Hints of this have been given by the rumors floating around Washington with respect to President Ronald Reagan's new proposal, which concerns reductions of strategic weapons as well as Senator Edward Kennedy's demand to halt the production of nuclear weapons.

Also neutral Austria's Foreign Minister Willibald Pahr considered this suspension in an atmosphere inflamed by the Polish situation to be the best alternative, but hoped that the various parties during this interval would come closer to one another in bilateral negotiations with respect to the remaining disputed questions.

10576

CSO: 3107/92

CSCE AMBASSADOR RICHARD MULLER DISCUSSES MADRID CONFERENCE

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 13 Mar 82 p 2

[Interview with CSCE Ambassador Richard Muller, date and place not given]

[Text] The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe being held in Madrid decided last Friday to suspend its follow-up meeting for 8 months to await an improvement in the international atmosphere.

[Question] Finland's CSCE delegation is, however, still continuing its work in Madrid. What will the delegation now do, Ambassador Richard Muller?

[Answer] We are now writing a final report and a general evaluation of the session that began in February and has now concluded on Friday. This report will be given to the Foreign Ministry. At the same time we will put all our papers and affairs in Madrid in good order so that after this interval we will be able to accomplish an easy start in the fall. We will leave Madrid at the end of this week.

[Question] What will happen during this interval?

[Answer] One of the most important justifications for suspending the meeting was generally to allow time to pass. It is hoped that this passing of time will have a positive effect so that the meeting can be concluded in a relevant manner in the fall. But our delegation as well as the delegations of other countries should make careful preparations for the meeting in November.

[Question] What will Finland do first, have you already made plans for the duration of this suspension?

[Answer] We already conducted joint preliminary discussions with the neutral and nonaligned countries before the delegations departed last weekend. We have had several discussions with those countries and we intend to continue these discussions during the 8-month interval. Actual preparatory work will begin in Madrid next September.

[Question] Finland's CSCE delegation now has behind it a year and a half of continuous and rather heavy work. Will there be a vacation?

[Answer] This depends completely on the Foreign Ministry, but perhaps a few weeks' vacation would be appropriate.

10576

CSO: 3107/92

KKE PAPER OBJECTS TO ROGERS' VISIT IN JUNE

NC081516 Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 8 Apr 82 p 2

[From the "Radical" column: "Undesired Visitor"]

[Text] At dawn on 18 October 1980, NATO Commander in Chief Rogers arrived secretly at the Ellinikon base on his way back from Ankara and brought to the government of the sinful rightwing, in power at that time, the sad order for Greece's reenclavement within the wolf alliance of NATO. The people's demonstrations of protest against this most shameful action of the New Democracy government are well known. Mr Rogers has not visited our country since that ill-fated day. But he has not "forgotten" us. And here he is, he will come again beginning of June for a "courtesy" visit! According to reliable reports, he is in fact coming as a representative of the imperialist "alliance" in order to step up pressuring the new Greek Government so that it may fully, and without any objection, align itself with NATO and U.S. cold war policy and their anti-Soviet campaign of hysteria. Shortly there will be a series of secret NATO meetings at various levels in order to incite tension, anti-Sovietism and particularly to further step up the nuclear arms race. The American-NATO imperialists do not like objections and above all "disagreements." They expect absolute discipline in following their orders. And it seems that Mr Rogers is coming to Athens to ensure this discipline and at the same time point out "settlement" of the Greek-Turkish dispute for the sake of the "alliance" and especially for the sake of the defense of the southeastern wing of NATO. The Greek people are opposed to the visit of the NATO stratocrat. Particularly at a time when NATO is directly inciting the Turkish junta's provocations against Greece, this visit is tantamount to open provocation.

CSO: 4621/270

INTRAPARTY ND DIFFERENCES ON ATTITUDE TOWARD PASOK ANALYZED

Athens EPIKAIRA in Greek No 711, 18-24 Mar 82 p 15

[Text] Several years ago, the present president of the republic observed that the opposition, in order to be persuasive and effective, must echo a displeasure towards the governing party corresponding in content and tone to that of public opinion. Premature and very sharp criticism of a new government, he added, can satisfy the most fanatical part of the opposing party's adherents, but it is ineffectual and probably detrimental as regards its effect on voters of the majority. This is because, most times, hasty criticism is not reliable, while sharpness can cause counter-coalescing in the area of the majority.

This viewpoint of Karamanlis, expressed at an unsuspecting time, has been adopted on general lines by the present official opposition; as a result, first Mr. Rallis, and then Mr. Averof, have been receiving fairly intense criticism from a part of the ND voters and cadres, who are blaming the party leadership for being hypotonic.

This tendency, which has been expressed for several weeks now by a part of the press friendly to ND, is an intraparty opposition to the party leadership, with the characteristic that it is not turned against personalities, but against the adopted tactics. Conversely, another part of the opposition press applauds the policy of mildness, also dissociating it from personalities. However, an analogous situation--and, in fact, more perceptible--prevails also in the area of the majority, where the internal contraposition has had a far greater significance since the different tendencies expressed tend to influence the agent exercising power.

Escalation of Acrimony

There is no doubt that the outcome of the intraparty confrontations--particularly the authority which will prevail in charting and exercising government policy--will also directly influence the climate of the government-official opposition contraposition. In a previous issue of EPIKAIRA, the column reported cases of acrimony in the political conflict which, in all probability, will be gradually escalated when the forthcoming legislation, with the "structural changes" pre-announced by PASOK, is introduced in the Chamber of Deputies and will reach a peak when it is realized that the course of the

"socialist transformation" is contrary to the constitution. Such a development can occur also in the difference which exists on foreign issues if PASOK undertakes a reorientation of foreign policy, particularly a revision of the country's international position.

'The Moderates'

Until that moment, however, according to the estimates of ND "moderates," the opposition's content and tone have clear specifications. More specifically, the moderates maintain that ND is not politically "legitimized" to accuse or provoke PASOK since PASOK is not implementing its extreme pre-electoral proclamations in the domestic or foreign sector. This is because such a tactic would concur with the pressure which is being exerted by the Left, and it certainly does not express the positions of the official opposition party. Consequently, according to the same viewpoint, with its policy, ND ought to "contribute" to the demythicizing of PASOK, which will be completed when that which is alluring is abandoned and it is known that many times in politics bringing that which is feasible nearer can be considered an achievement.

In other words, according to the "moderates'" estimations, as PASOK comes closer to the positions and policy of ND, the vision of "change," which decided the outcome of the last election, will be shown to be deceptive and unrealistic.

There is, however, the opposite viewpoint, with equally strong arguments. Supporters of the "hard line" consider the opposition which PASOK exercised against ND governments a model of successful tactics. Moreover, they consider it an established fact that, after five months of governing, Papandreou's party not only has not deviated from its original proclamations, but, contrarily, the way in which it systematizes the application of its program and plans "will bring ND and the country up against faits accomplis."

KKE-PASOK Relations

This difference in estimations in the heart of the official opposition party is expected to have effects on charting a line and on issues of broader political significance, such as PASOK and KKE relations. More specifically, the "moderates" maintain that it is expedient for ND to differentiate its policy toward the two parties, avoiding identifications, but also actions which lead to a frontal coalescing of PASOK and KKE. This splitting, it is added, can be crystallized in a series of amendments of rules governing formation of the political parties' representational presence, from the election of officers for syndicalist organizations to the electoral system used in the coming municipal and next parliamentary elections. More simply, according to this viewpoint, ND has no reasons to continue to not accept extension of the proportional system to all levels, since it has been shown in practice--particularly in the municipal elections, but also in other sectors such as the syndicalist--that the different electoral systems which aimed at strengthening the largest party stimulated, in the end, PASOK-KKE cooperation. It could be noted parenthetically that this choice is tending to be abandoned since ND

lost its position as first party and, correspondingly, it is tending to be adopted now by PASOK which is looking at the benefits of the reinforced proportional or even the majority system.

Adherents of the "hard line" in ND adversely maintain that the "correct" tactics for the official opposition party dictate that common PASOK-KKE positions be indicated and differences between the two parties be downplayed. In the same spirit, ND has no reason to back up or foment a dissension as long as the two parties persist in a--even if conventional--political cohabitation.

Under such conditions, the ideological-political positions on which the two parties will base the strategy for their contraposition in the immediate future remain essentially fluid and unformed. And this vagueness strengthens the opinion that the two largest Greek parties covered--each circumstantially--ideological and political sectors far broader than what they actually represent and express.

9247

CSO: 4621/246

COMMENTS ON BOMBING INCIDENTS PRESENTED

Disquieting 'Chain' Probed

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 16 Mar 82 p 5

[Editorial: "Discovering the Truth"]

[Text] Let us hope that this time the competent authorities will be less unlucky than their predecessors and will discover something about the bombings on 12-14 March. Let us hope and pray that they will succeed in opening a window on this darkness which for years now has covered a chain of events unprecedented for the country and inauspicious for its future.

It is, specifically, the chain which began with the assassination of the American diplomat in Psykhiko and continued with the murders of former and active policemen (one killed with the same pistol used to assassinate the American); this was followed by arsons in shops, then various other similar acts and we arrived at the bombings in the cathedral in Athens on Friday night, 12 March, in the post office and a bank in Xanthi, in a bank and a shop in Kavala and another in Ioannina. In addition, suspicions are being expressed that the fire at the new Kavala airport in Khrysoupolis was in no way accidental.

Of course, we will not supplant the police and, therefore, we will not "reveal" the culprits; nor will we place them in "territories" and "areas." However, we must note the steady repetition of the same phenomenon in every new episode in this category: that is, the effort to place its perpetrators in some political "territory" before there is even the slightest bit of evidence from the competent authorities.

This is, of course, absolutely in accordance with our tradition of assigning partisanship to everything. It is also in accordance with our inability to disengage ourselves from the typical forms of the past. But perhaps all these no longer have their old strength; perhaps the old forms can no longer contain the new facts....

A glance at what is happening today in many areas of the world would very easily convince us about all the new and troubling things taking place. And a glance at the new words being created by reality and life would inform us that the word "destabilization" has...stabilized its position in the daily vocabulary and confirms its existence in many countries with daily activity....

Perhaps our wine is too new to have settled in old goat skins?

We do not wish, with all this, to make tragic or magnify the bombings on Friday and Saturday. We do want, however, to stress what we invariably repeat every time such an episode is noted: That sometime there must be some beginning, some light must fall, so we can at last see where this chain of terrorism starts, where it is headed and what targets it has.

This is because it is really discouraging for there not to have been even some evidence about this for so many years--at least, for the public to have not been informed--and for all to be lost in the darkness, in this dangerous darkness which allows one to suppose whatever he wishes, to support whatever he desires, and to construe everything according to his interests, or according to his stupidity or intelligence.

Of course, one does not overlook the fact that the perpetrators of many of these episodes, especially the most sensational, have shown a high level of professionalism, so high that it is believed it has been imported from abroad like all items...of advanced technology. Due to this, the difficulties which their discovery presents are obvious.

Equally obvious, however, are both the manifold difficulties created by activities in the realm of this import and the even more manifold dangers which are entailed.

Let us hope that the authorities responsible for our security--and the security of each of us and our society and the country and, naturally, the republic--will be, as we said, less unlucky this time and will open a window for us on the darkness which has for years impenetrably covered all this particularly sensitive and manifoldly dangerous area of new activities. Let us also hope that everyone will have been convinced that simplifying the problem and inserting it in the area of partisan conflict can make us content, like all simplifications, but it probably has no relation with reality nor, even more, does it serve discovery of the truth. And discovering the truth is what is urgent.

'Neo-Fascist' Influence Seen

Athens I AVGI in Greek 16 Mar 82 p 1

[Editorial: "The Neo-fascists Must Be Crushed"]

[Text] The bombings in Giannena, Xanthi and Kavala have all the characteristics of fascist activity. Furthermore, it does not require a lot of thought for one to understand what forces are now pursuing agitation.

Moreover, there is also the avowal of the perpetrators themselves in yesterday's afternoon newspaper, in which one of the things they express is the demand for the juntists to be released from Korydallos!

We do not believe there is justification for so much caution on the part of the government representative in indicating the "political territory" to which the bombers belong. Nor do we believe that, with a downplaying of the bombings' significance the matter ends. Because, of course, we are not yet talking about actions significant in extent and impressions; but, if an effective mobilization against the culprits is not shown, there could be a more serious continuation in the frameworks of the extreme right's dark plans.

In principle, the government is obligated to pay special attention to the problem of the Security Corps' degree of effectiveness against the subversive activity of the extreme right and of foreign and democratic centers. But dealing with the bombers is not within the jurisdiction of the security forces alone. It is necessary for all the political democratic forces and the organizations of the workers and people--more generally, the labor unions--, etc., to participate in this work in an effort for active popular mobilization and political isolation of those undermining the republic. Only then will the neo-fascist bombers be completely unable to continue with impunity their catastrophic work.

9247

CSO: 4621/246

TRIAL OF DISK LEADERS UNDER WAY

Opening Trial Moves

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 25 Dec 81 pp 1, 9

[Article by Sukran Ketenci and Necdet Dogan]

[Text] ISTANBUL NEWS SERVICE -- Trial began yesterday of the 52 DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions] leaders being tried for capital offenses. The judicial committee ruled that the "state of war provisions" apply. In the controversy over limiting the number of attorneys, all attorneys left the courtroom when it was ruled to exclude Istanbul Bar President Orhan Apaydin.

As the trial proceeded without attorneys, DISK President Basturk's request for "rejection of the judge" was denied on grounds of noncompliance with the "state of war provisions." The request for an arrest ruling concerning 10 defendants not under detention was heard and the arrest ruling adopted. Trial will resume today at 1030 hours.

The defendants were brought into the courtroom around 0945. After the defendants took their places, the judicial committee -- consisting of president, Pilot Major Cetin Guvener; member magistrate, Judge Advocate Colonel Orhan Gurkan; hearing magistrate, Judge Advocate Captain Saygi Nalbantoglu; Martial Law Military Prosecutor Judge Advocate Colonel Suleyman Takkeci and assistant martial law prosecutors Aytekin Gani Ataman, Akoren Kandur and Asim Kutur -- also took their places and trial began.

Following the roll call of defendants as the session got under way at 1005 hours, the hearing magistrate moved on to the roll call of attorneys. The magistrate read the names of the 19 principal attorneys and, contending that the alternates would not be valid, requested the prosecutor's opinion. The prosecutor said it would be possible to have principals and alternates, but there were too many attorneys in the courtroom and, stating that it was their view as to the ability to conduct trial properly that article 85 of Law No 1402 should apply, requested that the state of war provisions be invoked.

Orhan Apaydin, president of the Istanbul Bar Association who was among the attorneys in the courtroom, contended that adoption of such a decision would limit the right of defense and that state of war provisions should not apply in routine martial law courts.

The judicial committee decided the issue after a period of discussion among themselves and reported that the aforementioned provisions would apply, that the state of war provisions would be appropriate for the trial.

The hearing magistrate also said, "Implementation of the state of war provisions means that attorneys and defendants who create a disturbance during trial may be removed from the courtroom if necessary. I want no objection to the ruling."

According to the court ruling, 52 attorneys will conduct the defense of the 52 defendants. However, the 19 principal attorneys who had been named in the earlier roll call will be included in this number.

Speaking to this, DISK President Abdullah Basturk requested postponement of the session for this matter to be decided and said that the 19 attorneys must be excluded from the 52 new ones to be designated. The magistrate, without accepting this objection, allowed the time needed to decide on the attorneys.

The session resumed after 15 minutes and Istanbul Bar President Orhan Apaydin, asking to speak on behalf of the attorneys, maintained that it was necessary to exclude the 19 attorneys designated by the court earlier from the 52 persons, because according to the relevant provisions of the law, the judicial committee could only limit the number of attorneys but could not designate individuals.

Hearing magistrate Cetin Guvener interrupted Apaydin in this statement and said, "I am accepting no objections. Our ruling was made." When Apaydin replied saying, "I am requesting to speak," the order was given to remove him from the courtroom. When this ruling was given, all the attorneys in the courtroom rose to their feet and said, "We will leave the courtroom, too." Judge Guvener said, "I did not mean you, I meant Apaydin," to which the attorneys replied, "We are all leaving, we cannot exercise our right of defense." And they all left together.

Meanwhile, the military guards said there were people without spectator's passes in the section for relatives of the defendants. One or two of the attorneys were understood to have taken seats in the spectator's gallery. The session magistrate then requested that these attorneys be removed. One who was expelled shouted, "Is the trial public or not?" The guards moved to intervene, but the person who had shouted left before it became necessary.

After the attorneys left, the session magistrate Cetin Guvener said that the session would resume with identification of the defendants. Basturk was the first defendant called to the microphone on the stand. Basturk said that he had something to say about developments prior to the roll call, but the judge replied, "You may not speak. This is only the roll call." Basturk insisted, saying, "But there is something I would like to say beforehand," to which the judge replied, "The state of war provisions apply to defendants also. If you persist, I shall have you removed."

After Basturk identified himself, DISK Secretary General Fehmi Isiklar was called to the stand. Isiklar pointed out that he would like to make a correction concerning the indictment and said that the expansion of DISK was written in the introduction of the indictment as the Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions whereas it appeared in the bylaws as Turkish Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions and that it was necessary that this be corrected. However, the judge replied, "It was written that way. We also entered it in the record that way. There will be no correction to the indictment." When Isiklar said, "But this is how it appears in the bylaws," the judge replied, "You are not under cross-examination now. You may enter it in the record later."

Following identification of the defendants, trial recessed until 1400 hours.

In the afternoon session, DISK President Abdullah Basturk, asking to speak after completion of the roll call, requested rejection of the judge. Basturk said, "Your committee, having adopted an attitude from the beginning to restrict our defense and having ruled the state of war provisions in effect, is not impartial. It is obstructionist. We reject the bench."

Asked for an opinion on the matter, Prosecutor (Judge) Col Suleyman Takkeci said that rejection of the judge could not be requested by reason of partiality of the magistrate, that this request did not comply with state of war provisions. Takkeci pointed out that according to article 40 of Law No 353, request for rejection of the judge was governed by article 37 and that the conditions under which rejection of the judge could be requested were specified here. "For this reason, we seek denial of the request for rejection of the judge as contrary to the law." The judicial committee concurred in the prosecutor's opinion, ruling that rejection of the judge could not be requested on these grounds, and denied the request.

DISK General Secretary Fehmi Isiklar asked to speak before the reading of the indictment began and said that the morning's developments leaving them without defense may have been the result of a misunderstanding and they would like to clear this up. Isiklar said that the judicial committee had the authority to limit the defense to 52 attorneys under the state of war provisions but stressed that it could not specify their identities, saying, "For example, one of our attorneys may not be able to come the next day. He may be ill. He may die. Therefore, the defense should not be limited by person. As a result of the morning's developments, we are without defense at the moment. We are not lawyers. The prosecutor cites an article of the law and we do not know what it means. We ask that you not deprive us of defense. The judicial committee should provide the opportunity for this misunderstanding to be rectified. I request clarification of the ruling."

Asked for an opinion, Prosecutor Takkeci said that prosecutors always had the right to dismiss counsel for the defense and, based on this, they saw no objection to replacement of counsel as long as the number of counsel remained 52. The judicial committee corrected the morning's ruling with the

decision that the restriction of counsel for the defense to 52 was not personal, but numerical, that is, the defendants had the right to defense by the counsel of their choice on condition that they not exceed 52 at any stage of the trial.

After this, reading of the 817-page indictment commenced.

Trial was adjourned for the day at page 37 of the indictment because it was getting late. But Prosecutor Takkeci took the floor first to request the immediate arrest of the 10 defendants not under detention who appear at the end of the indictment.

Takkeci contended that it would be appropriate for them to be under detention before concluding the indictment on the grounds that the crime for which they are being tried is a constitutional crime and also that it was unfair to the defendants under detention who are being tried on the same charges.

The judicial committee concurred in the prosecutor's request, ordering the arrest of Mehmet Mihlaci, Ali Sahin, Nusret Aydin, Tahir Guner, Turker Azakli, Ali Taser, Saban Aydin, Fikri Tanta, Kemal Akar and Dursun Ali Kocaman.

Trial will resume at 1030 hours today.

Attorneys Haggle with Bench

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 25 Dec 81 pp 1, 9

[Text] After the roll call of defendants at the DISK trial, the names of the 19 direct proxy attorneys were read. Attorney Orhan Apaydin, taking the floor when a dispute broke out over whether the joint proxy attorneys should attend the trial, said, "My power of attorney is in the file. The positive jurisprudence having the force of law contains no provision to imply that power of attorney should be granted by the principal party." The attorneys began a soto voce discussion among themselves, nipped in the bud by the session judge, Judge Advocate Major Cetin Guvener, who said, "No talking, gentlemen, no talking. This is not the place for a tea party." Asked for his view on the matter, Military Prosecutor Col Suleyman Takkeci said, "Their power of attorney may be collective or individual. We see no objection." Prosecutor Takkeci continued: "Bearing in mind the nature of the trial and the number of defendants, we seek to invoke article 18/N of Law No 1402 and article 85 of the Law on Court Martial Trial Procedure No 353. We request this of the bench."

Attorney Orhan Apaydin said that they could not concur in this view as martial law had not been proclaimed under the state of war provisions. While Apaydin was explaining why the number of defense attorneys should not be restricted, the session magistrate first interrupted to ask: "What is your name?" As Apaydin resumed his statement, the judge interrupted a second time, saying, "Speak without shouting." When Apaydin said, "I am not shouting, I am speaking loudly so that I might be heard. I am speaking as the voice of the defense," Cetiner [as published; Guvener] said, "There is no voice of defense,

there is the noise of the microphone." As Apaydin was saying, "I have not even had a chance to talk with the defendants," he was interrupted by Judge Cetiner [as published], saying, "Please, sir, don't stray from the point." This exchange took place between Cetiner [as published] and Apaydin:

Apaydin: We want our voice to be heard. We have been unable to talk as we should with the defendants until today. One attorney or 2,000 attorneys may come to this courtroom; 75 came. The number must not be restricted.

Judge: Come to the point.

Apaydin: If you will permit me to speak. I have been an attorney for 30 years, I know what I am talking about. Permit us to conduct the defense before history and public opinion. I know what I am talking about, but I start to speak and you interrupt. If you please, sir, let counsel not be obstructed in performing its job. Counsel may be restricted only in a state of war.

Attorney Turgut Kazan took the floor to say, "With the trial having just begun, we are concerned about this treatment of the defense. This situation arose before the manner in which we will conduct the defense was specified. Restriction must have a purpose. We will conduct the defense jointly. The defense attorneys will have a spokesman." Attorney Hasip Kaplan also took the floor and said, "The advocate relationship has the special force of law. Before debating whether the attorneys retained may attend trial, it is first necessary to ascertain whether the defendants accept the attorneys. We request this."

The judicial committee gave an interim ruling saying: "Recognizing that the case is such as to require joint defense, it is ruled by unanimous decision, under the guidance of article 18/N of Law No 1402 and in accordance with the final paragraph of article 85 of Law No 353: to accept in the capacity of counsel 52 attorneys, being one for each defendant; to raise the number of attorneys to 52, recognizing that the number aforementioned is 19; to accept as counsel for the defense the attorneys whom the defendants, being given the floor, will designate; and in this way to implement in subsequent stages of trial the State of War provisions of Law No 353."

Ugur Soylemezoglu, one of the direct proxy attorneys, rose and said, "I request permission to leave the courtroom." "I have confidence in my colleagues and wish to leave the courtroom after this kind of interim ruling," he said. Session magistrate Cetin Guvener said, "It is not up to you to criticize the interim ruling. I did not express lack of confidence in your colleagues," and ordered attorney Soylemezoglu's comments entered in the record. Speaking for the record, Guvener started out saying, "A person who says he is an attorney..." The defense attorneys said, "Not person, sir, attorney." Guvener replied, "You didn't hear my first word, that's what I said."

Articles Cited for DISK Prosecution

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 25 Dec 81 pp 1, 9

[Text] In the indictment of 52 persons from the DISK executive board, board of directors, oversight and ethics boards and regional representatives, the "Conclusion and Request" section names the defendants, after which it says:

"Since it is understood from the evidence presented in detail above and from their statements that, as members of an illegal Marxist-Leninist revolutionary organization, they attempted to overthrow state power, the Constitutional order and the basic institutions of the state by revolutionary methods, acting in conjunction with other laborer and middle classes under the leadership of DISK, which became a political organization of the working class, for the purpose of establishing a proletarian dictatorship and realizing proletarian socialism based on the rule of the working class, [it is requested:]

"That they be punished individually in accordance with article 146/1 of the Turkish Penal Code [TPC] which applies to their deeds and actions,

"That the Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions abbreviated 'DISK' be closed under article 30/4 of Unions Law No 274 as cited by article 15/1 of Law No 1402."

TPC article 146/1, under which the 52 DISK leaders are being prosecuted, reads verbatim as follows: "Those who attempt by force to alter, modify or abrogate all or any part of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey and to silence or prevent from performing its duties the Grand National Assembly established by this law shall be condemned to death."

Article 30/4 of Law No 274 on which the request to close DISK is based, contending that it comes within the scope of the trial on the basis of article 15, paragraph 1 of Law No 1402 pertaining to the duties and powers of courts martial, contains this provision:

"Professional organizations which engage in activities or foster goals in violation of the tenets of articles 1 and 2, paragraph 1 of article 3, article 4, paragraph 5 of article 19 and paragraph 1 of article 57 of the Constitution shall be closed by decision of the local court with jurisdiction over labor trials."

The articles of the Constitution cited by article 30/4 of Law No 274 on which the closure request is based are respectively:

"Constitution, Article 1 -- Turkey is a Republic.

"Article 2 -- The Republic of Turkey is a national, democratic, secular and social civil state based on human rights and the fundamental principles set forth in the preamble.

"Article 3/1 -- Turkey is a whole as a nation and a people.

"Article 4 -- Sovereignty resides unconditionally in the Turkish people.

"The people shall exercise their sovereignty through the organs empowered by the Constitution.

"The exercise of power shall in no manner be left to one specific individual, group or class. No person or organ may exercise the power of any state not founded on the Constitution.

"Article 19/5 -- No one may exploit or abuse in any form whatsoever religion, religious sensibilities or things held sacred by religion for the purpose of basing the fundamental social, economic, political or legal order of the state on religious tenets, albeit partially, or for political or personal gain or influence. The provisions of the Law shall apply to all natural and juristic persons who disregard this prohibition or encourage others to do so and political parties shall be permanently banned by the Constitutional Court.

"Article 57/1 -- The bylaws, programs and activities of political parties shall comply with the democratic and secular tenets of the Republic based on human rights and liberties and with the basic precept that the state is indivisible as a nation and a people. Parties which fail to do so shall be permanently closed."

'State of War' Provisions

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 25 Dec 81 pp 1, 9

[Text] The provisions to be applied in a state of war are set forth in Law No 353 on the Formation and Trial Procedure of Courts Martial, articles 248-250.

Article 248 prohibits appeal of court martial verdicts given in time of war. However, death penalties and penalties restricting liberty for 15 years or more may be reversed by the detachment commander or military section head. The Turkish Armed Forces Commander is the authorizing officer in the approval of death penalties.

Article 18 of Martial Law Act No 1402 empowers courts martial formed under the Martial Law Command to invoke the state of war provisions of the Law on Formation and Trial Procedure of Courts Martial.

It is specified, however, that the provisions of the Law on the Formation and Trial Procedure of Courts Martial relating to bringing suit and disposal of cases do not apply if martial law is not proclaimed by reason of war.

In this case, since the martial law in effect today was not proclaimed by reason of war, courts martial verdicts may be appealed.

Article 85 of Law No 353 provides for restriction of the number of defense attorneys when state of war provisions are in effect.

ALDIKACTI INTERVIEWED ON NEW CONSTITUTION

NC091350 Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 6 Apr 82 pp 1, 14

[Interview with Professor Orhan Aldikacti, chairman of the Constitution Commission, by TERCUMAN correspondent Yavuz Donat; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] Question: Public opinion is under the impression that the Constitution Commission tries to prolong the drafting of the constitution. Do you really do so?

Answer: I know that all the members of the Consultative Assembly, including the members of the Constitution Commission, wish to prepare a constitution that is most suitable to the needs of our country and to present it to the National Security Council. It is obvious that those who criticize us are not specialists on this subject. We are continuing our mission and we wish to accomplish this as early as possible. In the meantime, there is a statement by our honorable head of state in which he says that if the work of drafting the constitution cannot be finished by fall, it can be continued in spring. Our critics forget or do not wish to remember that the basic condition laid down by the head of state is that we must draft a constitution which will not prepare the ground for a return to the era prior to 12 September.

Drafting a good constitution needs hard work. Therefore, the chairman of a constitution commission cannot say: "I will finish the drafting of the constitution on a given date." I have expressed these views to various Western authorities, including Mr Tindemans. They showed understanding.

Question: In that case, if the elections are not held in September 1983, then they will have to wait until the fall of 1984. Is that it?

Answer: The political parties law will be enacted after the referendum. Our friends, writers and thinkers, who want us to commit ourselves to a date for elections, should first study the laws of the political parties elsewhere, and how they are made to see what conclusion they draw. We don't need to go outside our country--we too have an electoral law and a political parties law. Let them study those laws and see what is involved.

Question: We are told that those coming from the West keep asking you: "What will happen to Ecevit and Demirel when Turkey reverts to democracy?"

Answer: I have no authority to take any decision in this respect. You know we have an administration over us. A French journalist has told me that excluding the "leaders from politics would be undemocratic," and asked my opinion. I told him that the French should be the last to express any criticism in this respect. I quoted an example from history: Soon after the end of World War II, the French deprived those deputies, who had voted for the laws bringing Marshal Petain to power, of all political rights. As far as I remember, these politicians were deprived of the right to stand for election for 8 to 10 years. I cannot say whether this is wrong or right. But the children of those who were deprived of political rights entered politics later and were elected. I told this to Mr Tindemans and he said "It is true."

Question: Who is going to take the decision in this respect? Is it the National Security Council?

Answer: If such an issue is placed on the agenda, it would first be taken up by the Constitution Commission. I cannot know what kind of decision would then be taken. But it is a fact that Decree 52 bans further discussion on this matter.

Question: Members of the Constitution Commission are your friends. What is the impression they give you?

Answer: I would like to quote an example on this subject: When British Prime Minister Anthony Eden met with failure when he, together with the French, attempted to land at Suez, he realized the magnitude of his error and complying with the rules of democracy, he relinquished political life despite the immense services he had rendered to his nation in the past--before, during and after the war. If you ask my personal opinion, the former leaders should not participate in the elections. They should even withdraw from political life. They must admit that it is they who plunged this country into this predicament. If they do not take such a decision, Turkey may have to take unpleasant decisions.

Question: You have been given the views from various quarters regarding the constitution. Some of them suggest that the powers of the president of the republic should be increased. To what powers are they referring? What powers should we give to our head of state? According to a statement by Tindemans, our head of state told him that the presidential system is not wanted.

Answer: I was not present at the meeting. I do not know, but the nature of the presidential system suggested in 1975 is known. However, none of the views expressed to us in writing about the constitution suggested a presidential system. Certainly, there are views that the powers of the president should be increased. Since they desire both the parliamentary system expanded and the powers of the president increased, it is possible to give

the head of state a more active and a more effective role within a parliamentary system.

Question: Honorable Aldikacti. We are going to return to democracy. Parliament will elect a president of the republic. Is a presidential council contemplated in the meantime?

Answer: When I expressed my views in the MEYDAN magazine on the discussions which ensued after the notorious verdict of the Constitutional Court on the amnesty law in 1974-75, I deplored that the president of the Constitutional Court should get involved in those discussions and in acts of a political nature. This is what I then said: "Because of the nature of their office, the presidents of such high-level institutions as the Constitutional Court, the chief of the General Staff, forces commanders and high-ranking administrators should stay out of politics, and when they retire, they should--like the queen's Privy Council in Britain--form a council and assist the president of the republic, particularly in times of crisis." I still preserve this view today.

CSO: 4654/252

FAHRI ASSERTS INTRINSIC WESTERN ENMITY TOWARD TURKEY

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 5 Feb 82 pp 5,7

[Column by Mehmet Fahri: "This Is the West!"]

[Text] There are characters who have the habit of saying "I told you so" after every incident and development. I have never liked that attitude because I see vanity in it. Furthermore, most of these characters do not exactly say what they want to say. They say a lot of things including a series of possibilities; if one of them does not turn out to be right another one will.

To put it in a nutshell, these characters say ten different things, nine of those does not turn out to be right and if one does turn out to be right they begin bragging: "Did I not say so?"

Everybody has a way of looking at things. Our job is to write what we think is right and not to try to get a share of the credit afterwards if what we say turns out to be right. If what we say turns out to be right, that is good. If it turns out to be wrong then we will admit our mistake. This is our understanding.

Now after this introduction let us turn to our main subject.

When delegations from Europe began shuttling to and from Turkey we tried, from this corner, to express our displeasure at that state of affairs and to say that we did not approve of outside interference in our internal affairs. We tried to state that the visiting delegations had only their own interests --and not our welfare--in mind.

Despite what we said the delegations kept shuttling. One delegation came and before it left another one arrived under another name. Turkey was constantly on the agenda of meetings held in Europe.

The fact that Turkey was continually the subject of discussion among the Europeans was not because, as some writers said, the West is too fond of Turkey. On the contrary, this phenomenon resulted from exactly the opposite feeling and logic.

These people thought that they could decide Turkey's future political structure in their heads and that they could impose their views and thoughts on Turkey.

For months this insolence was treated with patience. A long time had to pass before these people could be told that patience, too, has its limits. Still, we could not make them understand, and, in the end, the Head of State, the Honorable [Kenan] Evren, gave them the proper response.

I believe that it will be very beneficial if this response, which has comforted us, brings some sense to people who have given themselves the right to intervene in our internal affairs.

It is clear that there are other means to resort to if Honorable Evren's following words does not jolt them into sense:

"We will definitely react to any intervention in our internal affairs...From this moment on, the center of gravity of our relations with the Council of Europe has shifted to the ministers' and delegates' committee where governments are represented. Our relations with the Council of Europe will depend on the attitudes of the governments involved. We do not consider the Council's Consultative Assembly, whose members are deliberately prejudiced and have their own machinations, as our counterpart.

"The Council of Europe has taken attitudes which contravene the sobriety of the rules of international relations, which force the limits of our patience and which are almost of hostile nature.

"Some members [of the Council] have violently attacked Turkey because their conflicts with Turkey rather than their loyalty to democracy."

Let us state here that this attitude of the West's is not new. In other words, as the Honorable Evren states, the West's enmity toward Turkey does not stem from the present system of administration in this country. The Westerners are simply exposing the enmity they have always had on the pretext of criticizing the present system of administration. That is all.

Once this fact is realized, I believe that it will be easy to decide what attitude to take toward the West.

9588

CSO: 4654/175

MUMCU EXAMINES GREEK ADVENTURISM

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 5 Feb 82 pp 1,9

[Column by Ugur Mumcu: "Greek Meddling"]

[Text] It seems that Greek Prime Minister [Andreas] Papandreou is preparing for war against Turkey and that to that end he has resorted to certain political tactics and tricks.

The fact that the "Moslem minority" in Greece--whose rights are guaranteed by the Lausanne Treaty--has been encountering various pressures while the Aegean territorial waters and airspace issues remain as explosive powder kegs reveals the motives of the Pan-Hellenic administration.

The U.S. "arms embargo" against Turkey after the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974 and the equipping of the Greek Armed Forces with modern arms and equipment during this period emphasizes a clear contradiction from a viewpoint of NATO's objectives. The Pentagon which only yesterday imposed an arms embargo against Turkey now wants to include Turkey in its "rapid deployment force" for the "defense of the Gulf."

According to Pentagon generals weapons given by the United States cannot be used for purposes "outside NATO objectives." Turkey was punished by an "arms embargo" for using NATO weapons outside NATO objectives in the Cyprus Peace Operation. Then, how does the "defense of the "Gulf" fit in NATO objectives? Why are multinational battle units being set up under the name of "rapid deployment forces" and why are weapons being allocated for this purpose?

We believe that the Cyprus problem, the arms embargo that resulted from that problem and the subsequent equipping of the Greek armed forces with modern arms and equipment are developments that are full of educational and thought-inspiring lessons.

It is suspected and seen that some Armenians and Greeks have a role in the wind of terror that was blown over Turkey after the operation in Cyprus. Have weapons been smuggled into Turkey through Armenian and Greek middlemen in preparation for a civil war while the arms embargo was on? To what degree are the events political?

The determination of political objectives and links is a government-level intelligence and evaluation effort. We suffice by exposing the role of Armenian rich men and Greek organizations in arms smuggling. Anything more than that is beyond our capabilities as journalists.

The largest scale arms smuggling operation in Turkey was carried out by M. Akil Cubukcu, a Syrian smuggler, and Garabet Serkis Abriyan, an Armenian. Garbis Mucuzyan, a jeweler from Beirut, Cemsit Sakuyan, a resident of Sofia, the Armenian-owned "Overco" company in Holland and the "Lebanon Jewelry" firm in Lebanon have established close relations with Turkish smugglers. In the incident where 63 TIR trucks were made to look like they had left Turkey, the "Lebanon Jewelry" firm bankrolled the operation and "Overco," owned by a Dutch-Armenian dispatched the goods. The incident took place when terror had reached a peak in the period before 12 September 1980.

Arms sent to Turkey through Greece by the well-known Lebanese arms and narcotics smuggler, Salim Meclis, were captured on the vessel "Liberta" in 1972. The [Athens] daily "Eleftheros Kosmos" reported on 5 February 1981 that Kalashnikov rifles, bombs and dynamites were discovered in a warehouse near Athens and that these weapons would be sent to Turkey through Bulgaria.

The smuggling operation discovered in 1977 on the Cyprus registered "Vasula" topped it all. This incident, which we have touched upon previously, is truly interesting.

This ship begins its journey from the port of Pireaus, sails through the Bosphorus and docks at Burgaz in Bulgaria. While sailing through the Bosphorus, the captain of the vessel tells the boarding Turkish authorities that he will pick up arms from Bulgaria and return; he requests that he be followed. Following a tip by a Turkish official the vessel is held up on its return voyage. The vessel is found to contain: "495 rocket launchers in 55 crates; 755 aiming devices for the rocket launchers in 21 crates; 990 ammunition sacks for the rocket launchers in 55 crates; 10,000 rounds of ammunition for the rocket launchers in 1,667 crates; and 60 gas bombs in 5 crates." The date is 3 June 1977, a time when terror is escalating.

Investigation of the incident reveals interesting conclusions. The captain of the vessel abandons his ship in Burgaz and he is replaced by a Greek who is not a captain and who arrives in Burgaz by land from Greece. During his questioning, Mantikas, the new captain of the vessel, says: "I was supposed to turn on my radio at 1300 hours every day. I was supposed to receive instructions from Greece, Germany, France or another country."

The firm that loaded the goods on the vessel is the famous Bulgarian smuggling firm, Kintex. The incident is very plain. A smuggling bridge has been established between Pireaus and Burgaz and the vessel has been caught in the Bosphorus on its way to unload weapons in Turkey or in the Greek islands. Hopefully, after this incident the Balkan Transport Company which handles the transit formalities of vehicles entering Turkey from Bulgaria as well as those of Kintex will stop processing papers for Kintex and will embark on

some form of a boycott. Incidentally, partners in the Balkan Transport Company include: former minister Nihat Kursat, former deputies Arif Ertunga and Osman Kavrakoglu and businessman Mehmet Ustunkaya. Dogan Tanyer is legal counselor for the firm. As is seen, there is open "Greek meddling" in this mysterious incident.

Let us also add this: Bekir Celenk, who was involved in several arms smuggling incidents in Turkey and about whom we wrote persistently several times before 12 September 1980, now lives in Pireaus under the protection of the Greek police continuing his business from where he left. How can Papandreou, who is oppressing the Turks in Thrace, permit a smuggler to live in his own port city? On what legal, humanitarian and "Pan-Hellenic" grounds can he permit that?

The terror experienced in Turkey is a multifarious issue. All aspects of the issue must be put together and then the issue must be studied in a realistic manner.

9588

CSO: 4654/175


ERRATUM: In JPRS 80543 of 12 April 1982,
No 1940 of this series, this article was
inadvertently published without photos.

CYPRUS

NATIONAL GUARD UNIFORM CHANGES

Nicosia 0 AGON in Greek 19 Mar 82 p 1

[Text] On the basis of the change in uniforms and emblems of the National Guard personnel approved yesterday by Parliament, the emblem of the Republic will appear on all uniforms. Moreover, each beret will bear the Greek flag within the emblem of the Republic. Finally, sergeant majors will henceforth wear four stripes.



CSO: 4621/252

U. S. BLACKMAIL CHARGED IN F-16 PURCHASE

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 8 Feb 82 p 7

[Article by Sp. Karatzaferis]

[Excerpts] By the use of many expedients, the Americans are blackmailing us into purchasing their own F-16 military aircraft instead of the French "Mirage 2000's," for two reasons:

One is purely economic. To keep their military industry from losing a very good customer, which is what Greece is.

The other is political. To have us remain linked to American military arms, and to have us put off our effort to provide military stores to our armed forces from various sources, so that we can gain an independence of maneuvering.

In the open, America is trying to persuade the Greek government to pick the F-16's over the "Mirage 2000's" by offering lower prices and more favorable terms. On the sly, it is blackmailing us by means of a war of nerves, through taking advantage of the fact that Turkey itself desires to acquire these F-16's. That is, we have a theater of the absurd here.

While Greece was having discussions with the French about supplying us with "Mirage 2000's," reports were published in the press concerning Turkey's desire to procure 291 modern fighters of the F-16 and F-18 type, and the readiness of the Reagan government to satisfy this Turkish desire.

War of Nerves

According to the assessments of military experts, to a large extent these reports represent a war of nerves against Greece. In commenting on this news, the same experts observe that:

It is utterly impossible for Turkey to supply itself with 291 F-16 and F-18 planes within a moderate interval of time, for the following reasons:

1. The production of such airplanes cannot exceed 3 to 4 per month, and consequently more than 5 years will be needed to deliver all of them.

2. Their utilization by the Turkish military air force will take a much longer time. If we calculate 1.5 pilots per airplane, we see that 450 pilots will have to be trained. For a pilot to be combat-ready in an airplane of this type, he should fly at least 100 hours after completion of studies at the various ground schools. Consequently, 45,000 hours will be required for 450 pilots. But during their further training on the F-16's and F-18's they will have to maintain at the same time their readiness on the other types, so that the combat preparedness of the Turkish military air force does not decline. That is, the Turkish air force will be called upon to sustain for quite a few years a number of airplanes much larger than what is permitted by its present organization, in terms of personnel and resources. The unavoidable consequence is that the program will have to be delayed.

3. The financial burden for such a procurement is tremendous. The purchase price alone will exceed \$5 billion. When we add to this the expenses for training, the construction of new costly facilities, and so forth, we arrive at an astronomical sum. Characteristically, just for the hours of flight needed to adapt to the new aircraft the cost will be 45,000 hours times 150,000 drachmas per hour equals 6.75 billion drachmas.

From the above the conclusion can be drawn that such a renovation of the Turkish air force cannot be done in less than 8-10 years. But what is both possible and probable is that Turkey will begin to modernize its air force at a rate of one to two squadrons per year. If America gives F-16 and F-18 aircraft to Turkey at this rate, it is certain that after 3-4 years the balance in the Aegean will have been upset, assuming of course that we ourselves remain at the present levels.

Balance of Forces

As matters now stand, today there is a relative balance in air power between Greece and Turkey, which would be radically upset if the American-Turkish black-mailing were to be successfully carried out.

Greece has at its disposal:

96 A-7H's (Corsairs)

96 F-84's and F-5's

38 Mirages F-10

40 Phantoms

33 TP-104's

106 reconnaissance, transport, and other planes of various types.

While Turkey has at its disposal:

32 Phantoms

48 100-C/D/F's

62 F/TF/104J's

64 F-84's

36 F-104 S's

83 reconnaissance, transport, and other planes of various types

Airports: Turkey has about 50 military airports scattered throughout its territory, starting from Izmir and extending to Erzurum or Diyarbakir. These airports are modern, have good anti-aircraft protection, and most of them have aircraft shelters. Upon taking off from Turkey's western airports, all the types of Turkish airplanes can reach any of the Greek airports. On the other hand, many of the eastern airports of Turkey are beyond the range of most of our own airplanes. A very small number of Turkey's airports are beyond the range of all of our aircraft, even that of the Corsair, which is the tactical aircraft with the longest flying range.

In Case of Confrontation

In examining the entirety of the Turkish air force, we see at first glance that in their first sortie, the airplanes it has available can transport a cargo of bombs and air-ground missiles so large as to be capable of putting out of action all the Greek airports. But this conclusion is entirely theoretical. In practice, a fair number of attacking Turkish aircraft will be shot down by Greek interceptor airplanes, while other much larger numbers will be compelled to drop their bombs wherever they happen to be, in order to become lighter in an attempt to avoid the Greek Mirages. Here we should say that the Mirage is the fastest and most maneuverable aircraft in this region and that it has powerful radar equipment which can locate the enemy from a long distance away. Consequently it is impossible for a "fleet" of Turkish aircraft loaded with bombs to cross the entire Aegean without encountering resistance.

The above by no means diminishes the potentiality of the Turkish air force. As is evident strictly from the numbers which we have cited, it constitutes a very substantial force for this area, and consequently there is no justification for this haste for it to be supplied with 291 super-modern aircraft.

12114

CSO: 4621/195

PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS IN NATIONAL DEFENSE BATTALIONS

Defense Ministry Decision

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 9 Feb 82 p 1

[Article by K. Giannopoulos]

[Text] The forces of those national-guard battalions which are located in the interior of the country are being disarmed and in essence reduced to the status of conscription units. This is from a decision by the minister of national defense concerning the reorganization of the TEA [National Defense Battalions].

The strength of the TEA will remain precisely as it is today only in the country's border areas, whereas in the areas of the interior and for periods of peace the number of men in the defense battalions is to be decreased by 90 percent, with only 10 percent of their present make-up remaining in order to form the core around which they can be developed to full strength if this is necessary. Moreover, the weaponry which the national guardsmen are carrying is being turned over to the depots of the army for safekeeping.

In his explanatory statements, Deputy Minister of National Defense Petsos stressed that it was decided strictly for military reasons that the TEA will remain as they are today in the territory of the borders and the frontier islands, "but no departure by these from the purpose which they have been drawn up to serve will be permitted."

Furthermore, no decision has been made as yet with respect to the political convictions of the enlisted personnel who will be selected to man those forces which are being retained. In any case, what has been decided for the armed forces will be in effect here also.

It is recalled that the TEA took their present form in 1970--with the junta's Legislative Decree "concerning a national guard"--as "special military units" having as their mission, among other things, "to help maintain and safeguard the domestic security of the country" and to protect their districts "from every communist or anarchist action." Of course, according to the same decree only "loyal citizens" were to be chosen for induction into this national guard.

KKE Disbandment Demand

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 6 Feb 82 p 1

[Text] The only solution which serves democracy and the cause of change is the immediate dissolution of the TEA. This categorical position is included in an announcement by the Press Office of the KKE Central Committee which relates to a statement made by a responsible source in the Ministry of National Defense on the reorganization of the TEA.

It was explained yesterday by the Ministry of National Defense that the government is studying the matter of the reorganization of the TEA, and it will make official announcements on this only when the study is completed. In any case, confirmation was given that the object of the study is not the abolition but the reorganization of the National Defense Battalions.

According to journalists' reports, the entire matter is being studied by a special committee of officers on the GEETHA [National Defense General Staff], and it is conjectured that this committee will finish drawing up a plan in March at the latest.

It is recalled that by way of an interpellation from its deputies which was submitted on 26 November 1981, the KKE had come out categorically against retaining the TEA. Their retention, it was noted in the interpellation, "does not make any sense in terms of the defense of the country, and on the other hand it undermines the national unanimity of the common people."

The KKE Press Office

The announcement by the Press Office of the Central Committee is as follows:

The TEA, where were formed to replace the Rural Security Units (MAY) in the period of the civil war, have no connection with helping the people in the defense of the country. Their only activity is to police and to terrorize the people of the countryside, as is stipulated also by the junta's Law 485/1970, which is still in effect as of now. The role of the TEA in the electoral coup of 1961 and in the period of the dictatorship is well known.

No reorganization of the TEA is going to change their character or make them more attractive in the eyes of the Greek people. In their minds, these battalions are identified with repression and the policy relating to anticommunism and the disuniting of the Greek citizens.

The only solution which serves both democracy and the cause of change is the immediate dissolution of these paramilitary bodies.

12114

CSO: 4621/195

BILL PROPOSES CHANGES IN POLICE FORCES

Promotions Outlined

Athens EXORMISIS TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 7 Feb 82 p 1

[Excerpts] By way of a bill which was introduced yesterday into the Chamber of Deputies by Minister of Public Order Giannis Skoularikis, certain basic issues of the security forces are regulated. These include the question of promotions, concerning which this bill provides for an abolishing of the relevant promotion lists in the higher ranks.

This bill settles a fundamental question which had arisen in the course of conducting reviews with respect to the leaders of these forces.

Henceforth, the choices for directors of the gendarmery and police chiefs 2nd class of the police will be made by selection.

The bill stipulates that the chief of the gendarmery will be selected from a promotion list made up of major generals and brigadier generals, and that the annual reviews of the security forces will take place in March instead of in May, which has been the case up to now.

Finally, the same bill increases the numbers of those admitted to the schools of the gendarmery, cities police, and fire department. Also it contains the clarification that for officers of the security forces, the regulations concerning the 35-year period of service continue to be in effect.

Meanwhile, in response to a question by journalists about whether the law "concerning public administration" which was passed also pertains to the general directors of the security forces, Minister of Public Order Giannis Skoularikis said that he does not believe so, because the cities police and the fire department are governed by the special regime of Law 671/77.

Previous Dismissals Studied

Athens I AVGI in Greek 10 Feb 82 p 3

[Excerpt] The Ministry of Public Order is giving consideration to restoring to active service thousands of dismissed commissioned and non-commissioned officers and men of the security forces.

According to information received by I AVGI, approximately 1,200 men--policemen, gendarmes, and firemen--have been ousted from the security forces in the period from 1967 to before the elections, mainly for political reasons.

The overwhelming majority of these policemen have been "fired, let go, or compelled to retire." A large number of these have been ousted from the security forces because they got married without the permission of their department. Remarkable also is the number of those who were dismissed from the police, gendarmery, and fire department in the period when the country was being governed by the administrations of the junta and of the New Democracy Party.

12114

CSO: 4621/195

GENERAL

TURKEY

BRIEFS

CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY APPOINTMENT--Ankara, 9 Apr (AA)--Former Transport and Communications Minister in the Uluşu government Necmi Ozgur has been designated by the National Security Council to fill the Consultative Assembly seat vacated by Mustafa Aysan, who was appointed as his successor in the ministerial post in March. [Text] [TA091500 Ankara ANATOLIA in English 1450 GMT 9 Apr 82]

CSO: 4600/387

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

April 26, 1982